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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
This court has jurisdiction over the matter under
Section 78-2a-3(g), Utah Code Ann, (effective January 1, 1988),
in that it is an appeal from final orders in a divorce modification proceeding.

After hearing on January 14, 1986, the court

entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of
Divorce granting Appellant Mrs. Jense a divorce under her
Counterclaim on July 9, 1986.

On December 7, 1987, the court

granted Mr. Jense 1 s "Motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce" and
"Motion" to setoff the amount of $10,000.00 against the divorce
judgment.

The court's Order modified the original Decree of

Divorce without the benefit of discovery or an evidentiary

hearing and vacated a subsequent judgment on the original Decree
of Divorce obtained by appellant Mrs. Jense, April 1, 1987.

The

court's December 7, 1987, Order modifying the Decree of Divorce
was entered over counsel for Mrs. Jense 1 s specific objections to
the proceeding.

The court, on December 8, 1987, additionally

denied the Appellant's Motion for a New Trial filed on the basis
of abuse of discretion, erroneous Findings of Fact and error in
law under Rules 52 and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
The issues before this court flow from the August 24,
1987, proceeding (final Order signed December 7, 1987), wherein
the court granted the Plaintiff Mr. Jense's Motion to amend the
Decree of Divorce which effected a modification of the original
Decree without a full evidentiary hearing and granted Mr. Jense's
Motion to setoff against Mrs. Jense's judgment against her husband in an amount of $10,000.00.

The issues presented for review

are:
1.

That the court abused its discretion in granting

Plaintiff's "Motion to Amend Decree" on August 24, 1987, by
failing to comply with Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of
Practice for the Third Judicial District Court (effective June 1,
1987), when the court allowed no evidentiary hearing on the
issues, further discovery, and proceeded on an Order to Show
Cause basis.
2.

That the court abused its discretion by failing to

grant Mrs. Jense's Motion for New Trial under Rules 52(b) and 59
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after objections to the lack of evidentiary proceeding were
entered during the hearing and after the hearing as constituting
an abuse of discretion and error in law.
3.

That the court abused its discretion or misapplied

the law in granting a modification of the Decree of Divorce
entered July 9, 1986, and vacating the money judgment thereon
entered April 1, 1987:
A.

The evidence presented failed to show a

"substantial change in circumstances" relating to the property
award, alimony and attorney's fee judgment sufficient to warrant
modi fiation of each award;
B.

The court made an error in law by setting aside

the judgment for accrued and unpaid alimony entered April 1,
1987;
C.

The court erred by modifying the property award

of $27,500.00 cash which at the time of the Decree "equalized the
award of the marital estate" and replaced it with real property
having no current equity.
4.

Where the Defendant presented specific unrebutted

evidence by Affidavit of the value and her possession of silverware at the time of the Decree of Divorce, which awarded each
party the items of personal property in their possession, did the
court err by:
A.

Signing an Order which did not reflect the pre-

ponderance of the evidence;
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B.

Setting off the value of the silverware against

Mrs. Jense 1 s judgment in an amount equal to an estimate made by
Mr. Jense.
STATUTES AND RULES REQUIRED TO BE INTERPRETED
This court will be required to interpret Rule 9 of the
Supplementary Rules of Practice-Third Judicial District
(effective June 1, 1987), which states:
Rule 9.

Modifications of Divorce Decrees.

a. When a modification in the terms and conditions of a Decree of Divorce is sought, the
issue shall be raised by filing of a Petition for
Modification and service of said Petition and
Summons upon the opposing party in accordance with
the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. No request for a change or a modification of a Decree shall be raised by way of an Order
to Show Cause.
b. After a responsive pleading is filed, and
discovery has been completed, counsel shall file a
certificate of readiness for trial, and the matter
shall then be heard by the assigned judge.
c. No Petition for modification shall be
placed on any law and motion or order to show cause
calendar without the consent of the judge to whom
the case is assigned.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On January 14, 1986, a divorce proceeding was held

before the Honorable Scott Daniels, Third District Court Judge,
on Mr. Jense's Complaint and Mrs. Jense 1 s Counterclaim for
divorce.

(January 14, 1986, Minute Entry, Record p. 85.)
2.

At the time of the hearing, the parties had been

married 33 years, both were employed, their four children were
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emancipated and they had accumulated significant real and personal property.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated

July 9, 1986, Record, p. 108-15.)
3.

At the trial, each party submitted their proposed

property distributions.

Both Plaintiffs Exhibit P-2 and

Defendant's Exhibit D-14 agreed that the parties' home located at
9200 North 4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, had a value of
$150,000.00 and should be awarded to Mr. Jense; the equity in the
property ranged from $41,000.00 to $47,926.00.

(Exhibit P-2,

attached hereto as Exhibit "A"; Exhibit D-14, attached hereto as
Exhibit

M

B"; Record, p. 84.)
4.

On July 9, 1986, the Court entered Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce (respectively
attached hereto as Exhibits "C" and "D"; Record, p. 108-15; p.
123-29.)

The pertinent provisions from the divorce Decree

relating to the issues on appeal, state:
"3. The real property of the parties is
awarded as follows:
"a. Plaintiff is awarded the equity of
the parties in the house and real property at 9200
North 4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to
the mortgage liabilities outstanding thereon; the
rental home at 582 West 850 North, Pleasant Grove,
Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities
outstanding thereon; the Tibbie Fork property; and
the residence at 45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove,
Utah, subject to Plaintiff assuming and paying the
outstanding mortgage owing thereon.
"b. Defendant is awarded the condominium
at 29 South State Street, #718, Salt Lake City,
Utah, subject to the mortgage outstanding thereon.
"4. The personal property of the parties is
awarded as follows:
-5-

"a. Plaintiff is awarded the Dasher automobile, the Cadillac automobile, the money in his
checking account, and the furniture and furnishings and
other items of personal property currently in his
own possession except for the items specifically
awarded to defendant as provided in the next
following subparagraph.
M

b. Defendant is awarded the Ford automobile, her retirement, the money in her checking
account, all the furniture and furnishings located
in the condominium at 29 South State #718, Salt
Lake City, Utah, and the following items of furniture and personal property located in the home
occupied by plaintiff at 9200 North 4650 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah: Large antique copper frying
pan; Antique church pew; French Provincial
armchair; Nantucket rocking chair; Antique frame
sampler; Hummel figurines; Bowl from Israel; Silver
hurricane lamp; Small spinning wheel planter;
Collection of antique spoons; Sterling silver
goblets; Silver chafing dish; Antique cradle;
Rocking chair; Bicentennial pewter plates; Poster
bed; Bowl and pitcher (gift from Aunt Louise
Watts); Antique quilt/antique valentines; Antique
quilt from defendant's grandmother; Moiri chair;
cross-stitch quilt; Bowl and pitcher (gift from
defendant's sister); Four Lladro figurines; Various
Royal Doulton figures; Collection of "Coalport
Cottages"; Defendant's clothing and personal
effects, including personal papers and books and
items which came from her family such as photograph
albums, diaries and similar personal items.
"7. In order to equalize the marital estate,
defendant is awarded a judgment from plaintiff in
the sum of $27,750 together with interest thereon
at the legal rate of 12% from February 24, 1986,
until paid in full. This obligation is ordered to
be paid by plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987,
and until paid this obligation shall constitute a
lien against plaintiff's real property located in
Utah County as provided in paragraph 3a above.
"9. No permanent alimony is awarded, but
Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendant temporary
alimony in the amount of $500.00 per month for a
period of one-year commencing with the month of
March, 1986, with each installment due and payable
on the 1st day of the month.
"Because of plaintiff's current financial
circumstances, however, defendant is ordered to
-6-

engage in no action to reduce these installments to
judgment or enforce payment thereof through execution until April 1, 19S7, in order to allow plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus
for the 1986 income year. Each installment of alimony shall bear interest from the date when due
until paid at the rate of 10 percent per annum, and
if by April 1, 1987, any installments have not been
paid, then defendant shall be entitled to reduce
any unpaid installments to judgment and enforce
collection through execution.
"10. Defendant is awarded a judgment for
the use and benefit of her attorney in the amount
of $5,000 plus costs including all appraisal costs
incurred by defendant in this proceeding in the
amount of $670. This obligation for attorney's
fees and costs shall be due and payable by April 1,
1987, and shall bear interest at the rate of 10
percent per annum until paid.
5.

On April 1, 1987, the Court reduced to judgment the

accrued amounts due and owing awarded under the divorce Decree
for alimony, attorney's fees and property distribution which,
with interest, equalled $43,314.46 (copies attached as Exhibit
"E"; Record, p. 144-145; 160.)
6.

Mrs. Jense initiated collection by executing on

Mr. Jense's car and garnishing his accounts (Record, p. 137-140;
p. 161-162.)
7.

On April 6, 1987, the Court granted Mr. Jense's ex

parte Motion to stay execution of the Judgment until April 14,
1987, at which time a hearing would be held on the issue.

The

Motion was granted on the basis of Mr. Jense's Affidavit stating
that he did not receive a bonus from his employment (Para. 5,
Record, p. 154); and that he could not raise money to pay the
judgment despite having placed the parties' home for sale (Paras.
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6 and 9, Record, p. 155-156); (Order Staying Execution and Return
of Property; Record, p. 146-149.)
8.

On April 14, 1987, the Court granted Mr. Jense's

Motion to stay execution of the judgment for four months and
granted Mrs. Jense $600.00 in attorney's fees.

(Minute Entry,

Record, p. 158; Transcript, April 14, 1987, p. 51, attached as
Exhibit "F".)
9.

On June 24, 1987, Mr. Jense filed a "Motion"

requesting the Court to set off against Mrs. Jense's $43,314.46
Judgment, the amount of $10,000.00 on the basis that Mrs. Jense
had obtained silverware after entry of the Decree of Divorce from
a safety deposit box at Deseret Bank located in Pleasant Grove,
Utah, which he assumed was awarded to him under the Decree of
Divorce.

("Motion" and Affidavit in support attached as Exhibits

"G" and "H"; Record, p. 167-168; p. 163-166.)

Mr. Jense, in his

Affidavit based his $10,000.00 estimate of valuation of the
silverware on his own financial statement dated October 31, 1984,
submitted to First Interstate Bank which he claimed was "prepared
by Mrs. Jense."

He offered no other basis for the valuation.

Further, Mr. Jense simply stated that to his knowledge, the
silverware had been maintained in the safety deposit box for an
unspecified three-year period but made no other statement with
respect to possession at the time of the Decree of Divorce.

Mr.

Jense's Affidavit regarding knowledge of possession of the
silverware is contrary to the evidence in the record at the time
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of the divorce proceeding.L
10.

The next most significant Motion over which this

appeal arises was made by Mr. Jense on August 3, 1987.

Plaintiff

filed a "Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce" wherein Plaintiff
moves the Court
"...to amend the Decree of Divorce to delete
payments due to the Defendant and vacate the
judgment against the Plaintiff based on this change
of circumstances and to order that any payments
which the court order to be paid to the Defendant
by Plaintiff be paid from proceeds of the sale of
the parties1 home when sold."
(Motion and Affidavit in Support, attached as Exhibits "I" and
"L", respectively; Record, p. 169-71; 172-78.)
11.

Mr. Jense1s Affidavit in support of the Motion to

Amend, in pertinent part states:
"a. Mr. Jense has attempted to sell the
Pleasant Grove home he was awarded for a period of
six months without any success but estimates he
will receive $119,000.00 as gross proceeds from the
sale (paragraph 4 ) ;
"b. His employment was terminated July 17,
1987 (paragraph 6 ) ;

ion May 29, 1985, in response to Plaintiff's
Interrogatories, Mrs. Jense filed Answers with Exhibits. In
response to No. 17 regarding safety deposit boxes, Mrs. Jense
identifies the safety deposit box at Deseret Bank, Pleasant
Grove, Utah, and states, "There are no items in the box and
Plaintiff has the keys." (Answer attached as Exhibit "I".) In
response to Interrogatory No. 7 to "describe all furniture, fixtures and appliances and household goods owned by you," Mrs.
Jense filed "Attachment 2" to the Interrogatories with a fourpage itemization. The silverware is identified as being located
in her condominium at 29 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah. ("Attachment 2" attached as Exhibit "J".)
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n

c. Upon termination, he received $6,100.00
(paragraph 7 ) ; and
"d. Mr. Jense was employed by American Equity
for 15 years where he annually received bonuses of
$10,000-$72,000, but no bonus was paid during the
calendar year 1987 (paragraph 9 ) . "
12.

Plaintiff's counsel noticed up the "Motion" for

setoff on the silverware and "Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce"
for August 24 # 1987 (Record, p. 179-80.)
13.

On August 21, 1987, Mrs. Jense filed a "Verified

Reply to Plaintiff's Motion" with an attached Affidavit of Kay
Jacobs, President, Deseret Bank and an itemization of the value
of the silverware based upon retail prices for each piece (copies
attached as Exhibit "M"; Record, p. 268-74).

Mrs. Jense's

Affidavit in pertinent part states:
A.

She was awarded the personal property in her

possession by the Decree of Divorce dated July 9, 1986, then
located in her condominium (Para. 1 ) ;
B.

The silverware had been located in her con-

dominium on July 9, 1986, and had been in her condominium since
March, 1985 (Para. 2 ) ;
C.

Kay Jacobs, President, Deseret Bank,

corroborates Mrs. Jense's statement in his Affidavit by stating
that the bank records show the last entry to the safety deposit
box was March 5, 1985;
D.

Mrs. Jense states that Mr. Jense was aware she

maintained the silverware in her condominium and that it had only

-10-

been temporarily placed in the safety deposit box as a safety
measure (Para. 3 ) ; and
E.

The value of the silverware was not $10,000.00

as estimated by Plaintiff in his October 31, 1984, Financial
Statement for First Interstate Bank, but was $4,417.50 based upon
an itemized retail price for each piece of silverware (Para. 4,
Exhibit "B" to Affidavit).
14.

On August 21, 1987, Defendant filed an "Answer to

Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce" alleging the affirmative
defense of res judicata and responding to the specific allegations on the Motion to Amend (attached as Exhibit "N"; Record, p.
265-274) .
15.

On August 24, 1987, the court held an abbreviated

hearing on Mr. Jense's "Motions", at which time the Defendant's
counsel consented to go forward with the hearing on the "Motion"
for setoff on the basis of proffer of evidence and Affidavits but
objected to consideration of the "Motion to Amend Decree of
Divorce" stating:
"If the court is genuinely interested and believes
that there is a basis for consideration and modification of a property distribution, then I think we
have a right to a complete trial to open that
issue, rather than this very short hearing and
these proffers of counsel which is coming before
the court today. (Transcript, p. 9, line 21,
through p. 10, line 1.)
"As I am saying (1) we don't believe there is sufficient cause for even a consideration of change of
property; but if there is, we believe we are
entitled to complete trial on that issue....
(Transcript, p. 10, lines 12-15.) (Complete copy
of Transcript of August 24, 1987, hearing attached
as Exhibit " O " . ) "
-11-

16.

Despite counsel's objections, the Court allowed no

discovery on the issues, oral testimony by witnesses or other
standard evidentiary proceeding required by Rule 9 of the
Supplementary Rules of Practice of the Third District Court and
granted Plaintiff's Motion on an Order to Show Cause basis.
17.

Mr. Jense's counsel tendered the proposed Order to

Judge Daniels on September 24, 1987, (attached as Exhibit "P";
Record, p. 222-226; p. 260-264.)

The Court's Order, which was

subsequently signed December 7, 1987, modifies paragraphs 3, 4,
7, 9, and 10 of the original Decree of Divorce and vacates the
April 1, 1987, judgment for accrued alimony, court-ordered attorney's fees and payment of $27,750.00 plus interest as property
equalization.

The "changed circumstances" identified in the

Findings warranting this modification and vacating the judgment
were:

Mr. Jense did not receive a bonus in 1987; Mr. Jense was

terminated from his employment in July, 1987; the selling price
for the parties' home, rather than the appraisal price at the
time of the Decree of Divorce of $150,000.00, was scheduled to be
a net $119,000.00 (pp. 2-3, Exhibit "P", Record, 261, 262).

(The

home of the parties in Pleasant Grove, Utah, did not sell at that
time, and there is an anticipated sale which will now produce a
net of $4,000.00 to Mrs. Jense which the court has ordered will
satisfy her $44,000.00 judgment.)

The Findings of Fact further

state:
"The Defendant, between the time of the trial in
this matter on January 14, 1986, and the entry of
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce on July 14, 1986, went to the bank where
-12-

the parties had stored their silverware and removed
that silverware from the safety deposit box. The
Plaintiff believed the silverware was worth
$10,000.00 while the Defendant believed that it was
worth approximately $4,500.00;" ("Order", p. 3,
Exhibit "P"; Record, p. 262.)
Based upon the change of circumstances, the court ordered:
"A.

The Decree of Divorce and all prior orders and

judgments would be satisfied upon payment of the proceeds of the
sale of the Pleasant Grove home to Mrs. Jense;" and
"B.

Mrs. Jense was awarded all right, title and

interest to the silverware."

("Order", p. 4, Exhibit "P";

Record, p. 264).
18.

On November 5, 1987, Defendant filed her objections

to the proposed Orders on the ground that:
A.

The Court unlawfully granted a modification of

the Decree of Divorce without a full evidentiary hearing and over
the Defendant's objections (para. 1, p. 3, Memorandum in Support
of Objections; Record, p. 232);
B.

That the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

did not accurately reflect the court's ruling in the hearing or
the language in the Decree of Divorce (pp. 4 and 5, Memo; Record,
p. 233-34);
C.

That the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

did not accurately reflect the court's Order issuing from the
April 14, 1987, proceeding (p. 6, Memo; Record, p. 235);
D.

That the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

did not reflect the evidence in the record regarding the
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possession of the silverware at the time of the entry of Decree
or its value (pp. 7 and 8, Memo; Record, p. 236-37).
19.

On November 5, 1987, counsel for Mrs. Jense filed a

"Motion for a Trial" and Memorandum in support thereof, asserting
that:
A.

The Court failed to follow Rule 9 of the

Supplementary Rules of Practice when granting Mr. Jense 1 s Motion
on an Order to Show Cause basis and that the court was obligated
to grant a full evidentiary hearing on the alleged "changed circumstance" warranting a modification of the Decree (Point I,
Memo, Record, p. 243);
B.

The Plaintiff failed to meet his burden in

showing a substantial change in circumstances (Point II,
Memorandum in support; Record, p. 244); and
C.

The court erred by modifying the alimony

judgment which had been fully vested on April 1, 1987; (Point
III, Memo; Record, p. 246).
20.

After hearing on December 1, 1987, Mrs. Jense's

objections to the proposed Order were overruled and the Motion
for New Trial denied.

(Minute Entry, December 8, 1987, attached

as Exhibit "Q"; Record, p. 254-55.)
21.

Judge Daniels signed the proposed Order December 7,

1987 (Exhibit "P"; Record, p. 260-264.)
22.

Mrs. Jense filed this appeal regarding the Order of

Modification of the Decree of Divorce issuing from the August 24,
1987, hearing and the denial of her Motion for a New Trial.
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SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS
1.

On August 24, 1987, the court held a short pro-

ceeding on Mr. Jense's "Motion to Amend Decree" entered July 9,
1986, and "Motion" to setoff against Mrs. Jense's divorce
judgment.

The Order issuing from the hearing was an abuse of

discretion in that:
A.

The Court, after being advised of objections to

the proceeding, failed to follow discovery and evidentiary
hearing requirements of Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of
Practice of the Third District Court;
B.

The Order modified the alimony, attorney's fees

provision and property settlement of the July 9, 1986, Decree.
The factors constituting a "change in circumstance," i.e.
decrease in value of Mr. Jense's residence since the entry of the
Decree, loss of job five weeks prior to the hearing and loss of
bonus income for 1987, did not relate to the basis for making
each award in the Decree, each were not "substantial and compelling" changes of circumstance and ran only to the ability of
Mr. Jense to pay the judgment.

Modification of the Decree was,

therefore, an abuse of discretion;
C.

Under Utah law, alimony becomes vested as it

accrues and is not subject to modification.

The trial court's

order modified the alimony judgment which accrued as of April 1,
1987, which is an abuse of discretion.
2.

The Findings of Fact and Order issuing from the

August 24, 1987, hearing, should be set aside as not reflecting
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the preponderance of the evidence.

The intent of the original

divorce Decree awarded Mrs. Jense all items of personal property
located in her condominium.

Mr. Jense filed a Motion to setoff

the value of silverware which he claimed was awarded him# in an
amount equal to $10,000.00.

His Affidavit did not establish the

location of the silverware and his assertion of value was based
upon an estimate put on a financial statement he submitted
October 31, 1984.

Mrs. Jense submitted an Affidavit, which was

corroborated by the president of the bank where the silverware
was held, that she had obtained the silverware March 5, 1985,
more than one year prior to entry of the Decree and had maintained it in her condominium since that date.

Furthermore, Mr.

Jense was aware of her possession of the silverware through
Answers to Interrogatories provided by Mrs. Jense prior to trial.
Mrs. Jense established the value of the silverware at $4,417.50
by itemizing the retail price of each piece of silverware in her
possession.

The Order issuing from the Findings of Fact should

be set aside in that the Order awarded Mrs. Jense silverware
which was already in her possession under the Decree of Divorce
and established its value at $10,000.00, which was setoff against
Mrs. Jense's judgment.
3.

The Court abused its discretion by failing to grant

Mrs. Jense 1 s Motion for a New Trial after having been informed of
its failure to follow Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of
Practice and its failure to enter Findings of Fact and issuing an
Order which did not reflect the preponderance of the evidence.

-16-

LEGAL ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this appeal is the August 24, 1987, hearing
on Mr. Jense's "Motion to Amend Divorce Decree" and "Motion" for
setoff against the judgment of the value of the silverware, and
the post-hearing objections to the proposed Order and Motion for
New Trial.

This brief will state applicable legal standards by

which the trial court's action should be reviewed and appropriate
legal principles which should have been applied by the trial
court in ruling on the Motions.

Based upon these standards, it

will be clear to this court that the trial court abused its
discretion and misapplied applicable principles of law when
entering its Order modifying the Decree of Divorce and setting
off the value of the silverware against the Defendant's April 1,
1987, Judgment.
I.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND MISAPPLIED
THE LAW IN MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
The court's Order issuing from the August 24, 1987, proceeding modified paragraphs 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the original
Decree.

Paragraph 3 of the Decree awarded the home at 9200 North

4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, to Mr. Jense; paragraph 4
awarded the items of personal property located in her condominium
at 29 South State, #718, Salt Lake City, Utah; paragraph 7 states
"in order to equalize the marital estate, the Defendant is
awarded judgment from Plaintiff in the sum of $27,750.00 together
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with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12 percent from
February 24, 1986, until paid in full" which was ordered paid on
or before April 1, 1987.

Paragraph 9 awards temporary alimony in

the amount of $500.00 per month for one year commencing March,
1986, and the installments would be reduced to judgment or
enforced through execution on April 1, 1987, "in order to allow
Plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus for the 1986
income year."

Paragraph 10 awards Mrs. Jense attorney's fees in

the amount of $5,000.00, plus costs of $670.00 which is due and
payable April 1, 1987, bearing interest at the rate of 10 percent
per annum.

Each of those separate awards were reduced to

judgment April 1, 1987, in an amount equalling $43,416.46.

The

court's Order from the hearing modified each of those paragraphs
in that it orders all judgments will be satisfied by payment of
the proceeds of the sale of the Pleasant Grove home, and awards
the silverware to Mrs. Jense and sets off the value thereof
against the total judgment.

Mrs. Jense will effectively end up

with $4,000.00 from her $44,000.00 judgment and silverware which
she has possessed for a year and three months prior to the entry
of the Decree of Divorce.
The "changed circumstances" alleged by Mr. Jense run
solely to his ability to pay the judgment under the divorce
Decree rendered July 9, 1986.

(Emphasis added.)

The alleged

"changed circumstances" do not relate to the basis of the award
for alimony, attorney's fees or "equalizing the marital estate."
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Under existing case law, the modification was a misapplication of
law to facts and should be overturned.
A.

Legal Standards of Review of Modification of Divorce

Decrees.
The standards of review of trial courts' granting modification of the Decree of Divorce is:

"Defendant must show that

the evidence clearly preponderates against the Findings of Fact
or that the trial court has abused its discretion,"

Thompson v.

Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985), citing Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 198Q); Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d
6 (Utah 1982).

Although the Fletcher case was a direct review of

a divorce proceeding, the review of the rulings by an appellate
court should apply the same legal standards.

As stated in

Fletcher, "On appeal, this Court will not disturb the action of
the trial court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary, or the trial court has abused its discretion or
misapplied principles of law."

Fletcher v. Fletcher, at p. 1222

(citations omitted).
Additionally, the reviewing Court has broad powers when
reviewing modification orders.

"Under prevailing standards of

review, the appellate court may review both the facts and law of
matters in equity, such as a request for modification of the
Decree."

Boals v. Boals, 664 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1983).
A trial court must apply a variety of legal standards to

the equitable proceeding when considering modification of a
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divorce decree.

Legal principles enunciated by the Utah Supreme

Court which are applicable to the modification being reviewed by
this court are:

the movant has the burden to show a substantial

change of circumstances since the Decree that was not originally
contemplated within the Decree itself.

Woodward v. Woodward, 709

P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Thompson v. Thompson, supra., at p.
362.

The party seeking the modification must prove a substantial

and permanent change of circumstances necessitating the modification.

Kiesel v. Kiesel# 619 P.2d 1374# 1376 (Utah 1980).

Property division, as opposed to alimony and child support
awards, are entitled to greater sanctity and modification should
be granted "only upon a showing of compelling reasons arising
from a substantial and material change in circumstances."

Also,

the change in circumstance must be "sufficiently radical" to
justify modifying a property division.
P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981).

Folger v. Folger, 626

When a substantial change in cir-

cumstances is shown, the substantial change must relate to
the basis upon which the original award was made by the trial
court.

Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah, 1985).

Equity is not available to remedy a "bad bargain" entered into by
a party based upon a request for modification.
P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980).

Land v. Land, 605

Courts are required to give divorce

Decrees final status accorded to any other civil judgment and
apply their doctrine of res judicata where appropriate; the parties are entitled to rely on the finality of alimony awards in
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determining the right to receive and the duty to pay,
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 438 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah, 1968); Klein v.
Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1975).
B.

The Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to Follow

Its Own Rules When Granting Modification of the Decree.
The trial court failed to follow the specific provisions
of Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of Practice of the Third
District Court (effective June 1, 1987) and thereby abused its
discretion in granting Mr. Jense's "Motion to Amend Divorce
Decree".

Rule 9 requires that a formal Petition for modification

be filed with the court and served on the party under Rule 4 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure after which the Defendant has an
opportunity to respond to the Petition and conduct formal discovery on the issues raised therein.

Further, the rule specifi-

cally prohibits modification proceedings on an Order to Show
Cause basis.
The Motion to amend the Decree of Divorce was filed
August 3, 1987, and the "Motion" for setoff was filed June 24,
1987, with each Motion being noticed for hearing on August 24,
1987 (Record, p. 179-180.)

At the hearing, the trial court pro-

ceeded based on proffers and Affidavits on file, allowed no
further discovery and no full evidentiary hearing on the modification issues despite clear and strenuous objection from Mrs.
Jense's counsel.

(August 24, 1987, Transcript, pages 10 and 11.)

Over Defendant's oral objections at the August 24, 1987, hearing
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and further written objections to the nature and course of the
proceeding filed November 5, 1987, the trial court entered its
orders modifying the Decree of Divorce.

The granting of the

modification was a clear abuse of discretion, frustrating the
clear intent of Third District Court rules.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is an abuse of
discretion for a district court judge to fail to set aside an
Order entered after the district court judge fails to follow the
Supplementary Rules of Practice created in the district.
Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1984).

The court's

error was pointed out by Mrs. Jense's counsel both during trial
and by specific Memorandum filed November 5, 1987, yet the judge
allowed the Order to stand.

Entry of the Order on December 7,

1987, was a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.
C.

The Court Misapplied the Law When Finding That

"Substantial Change in Circumstances" Occurred Warranting
Modificat ion.
Although the court has broad discretion in determining
what constitutes a change in circumstances warranting modification, it is obligated to follow case precedence when deciding
what factors are substantial and significant to warrant modification.

In this instance, the court failed to follow clear prece-

dence on the issues raised.
Reviewing the three factual bases which were allegedly
sufficient to constitute a "substantial change in circumstance"
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shows that, for the most part, each "circumstance" does not
relate to the basis upon which the award was made and, therefore,
is insufficient to meet the "substantial change" burden.
Mineer v. Mineer, supra.

At most, the change in circumstance

runs to Mr. Jense's ability to pay the awards one year after
the original judgment is entered.

In Mr. Jense's Affidavit sub-

mitted in support of the "Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce," he
alleged the three bases upon which the property award, alimony
award and attorney's fee award ought to be set aside were:

On

June 17, 1987, he lost his job (para. 6 ) ; he did not receive his
annual bonus from his employer (para. 9 ) ; and the house which
both parties valued at $150,000.00 at the time of the Decree of
Divorce would sell for only $119,000.00 (para. 4 ) .
In reviewing the following Findings of Fact which are
the basis of each of the separate awards in the Decree, the Court
should keep in mind that the marital estate of the parties must
be evaluated at the time of the Decree of Divorce and awards
based upon the then-current values, assets and income.
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-1223 (Utah 1980).
Finding of Fact No. 11 (Record, p. 105) regarding alimony states:
"However, based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties, Plaintiff should pay to
the Defendant temporary alimony in order to give
Defendant the opportunity to establish herself...an
amount of $500.00 per month for a period of one
year...."
The Finding of Fact continues:
"Because of Plaintiff's current financial circumstances, however, Defendant should engage in no
activity to reduce these installments to judgment
-23-

or enforce payment thereof through execution until
April lf 1987, in order to allow Plaintiff an
opportunity to receive his income bonus for 1986
income year."
The alimony award was subsequently reduced to judgment April 1#
1987.
Finding of Fact No. 12 (Record, p. 105# 106) regarding
attorney's fees states:
"In light of the disparity of the incomes and the
current financial circumstances of the parties, the
Plaintiff should be required to pay Defendant's
attorney's fees in the amount of $5,000.00,
together with all costs including appraisal costs
incurred by the Defendant in the sum of $670.00.
The obligation for attorney's fees and costs should
be due and payable April 1, 1987...."
The attorney's fees award was reduced to judgment April 1, 1987.
Finding of Fact No. 9 (Record, p. 104) regarding the
property award of the marital estate, states:
"In order to equalize the marital estate, Defendant
should be awarded a judgment from Plaintiff in the
sum of $27,750.00 with interest thereon at the
legal rate of 12 percent from February 24, 1986,
until paid in full. This obligation should be paid
by Plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, and until
paid, this obligation should constitute a lien
against Plaintiff's real property located in Utah
County..."
This award was also again reduced to judgment April 1, 1987.
Reviewing each "changed circumstance" as it relates to
the basis for each award clearly reveals the court's erroneous
determination of a "substantial change in circumstance"
warranting modification.
(1)

Job loss, July 17, 1987:

First of all, the

job loss is temporary in nature and should not warrant modifica-
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tion of any of the three separate awards.
supra.

Kiesel v. Kiesel,

The Affidavit of Mr. Jense was executed two weeks after

the job loss.

The court made no further inquiry into his ability

to obtain a job or his prospects and allowed Defendant no opportunity for discovery on the issue.

Further, the job loss

occurred three months after the due date for payment of alimony,
attorney's fees and the equalized property distribution.
The alimony award was based upon "need" at the time of the Decree
of Divorce, the attorney's fees was based upon "disparity of
income" at the time of the Decree of Divorce and the property
distribution was based on an evaluation of the then-existing
value of the assets and not Mr. Jense's income.
(2)

Decrease in value of the home from $150,000.00

to $119,000.00: Initially, it must be pointed out that both Mr.
and Mrs. Jense agreed on the value of $150,000.00 for the
Pleasant Grove home and agreed that the Plaintiff should receive
it (Exhibits P-2 and D-14, attached as Exhibits "A" and " B " ) .
Mr. Jense received precisely what he bargained for which turned
out to be not as good an investment as he anticipated at the time
of the Decree.

He is essentially asking the court to overturn a

bad bargain which he made which, under the principles of equity
of modification, is not an acceptable "changed circumstance."
Land v. Land, supra.

The decrease in value of the asset does not

relate to the court's Findings of Fact regarding the award of
alimony, attorney's fees or property distribution.
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Further, it

must be noted that Mr.

Jense did little, if anything, to sell

the Pleasant Grove home until March, 1987, for a period of nine
months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce.

He clearly

contributed to the problem by failing to act to liquidate the
asset.

This is especially true when he must have known that his

employer was experiencing financial difficulties and he could not
anticipate the bonus for 1987.
(3)

Failure to receive 1987 bonus;

Mr. Jense's

failure to receive his annual bonus is a circumstance which does
not relate to the basis of the $27,750.00 property award.

As

stated in the Findings of Fact, the award was made "to equalize
the assets of the parties" and did not relate to Mr. Jense 1 s
income.

Not receiving the bonus also does not relate to the ali-

mony award (need of Mrs. Jense as of July 9, 1987, for a twelvemonth period) or the award of attorney's fees ("based upon
current disparity of income of the parties").

The fact that Mr.

Jense did not receive the bonus simply impaired his ability to
make the payment due on April 1, 1987, but did not justify
entirely setting aside each of the awards.

It is not the kind of

"compelling circumstances" justifying setting aside the entire
property award as envisioned in Folger, supra.
In summation, on the surface, the loss of job, decrease
in value of the home and lack of bonus creates a somewhat
appealing case for "substantial change in circumstance."
However, when reviewed in the light of how each of those factors
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relates to the basis for each award, it is clear that it does not
justify abrogating alimony, attorney's fees and a property award
on a permanent basis.

The awards which were made by the court on

July 9, 1986, and were due and payable April 1, 1987, were
inappropriately modified by misapplication of law to the facts.
D.

The Court Misapplied the Law and Abused Its

Discretion by Vacating the Judgment for Accrued and Unpaid
Alimony.
The court's December 7, 1987, Order effectively vacated
the alimony judgment which had accrued for twelve months as of
April 1, 1987, and was reduced to judgment in the amount of
$5,549.80 (Record, p. 160). The Utah Supreme Court has been unequivocal on the point.

"In this jurisdiction, alimony and sup-

port payments become unalterable debts as they accrue; therefore,
a periodic installment cannot be changed or modified after the
installments have become due."
79 (Utah 1977).

Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077,

"Installments of support payments ordered in a

divorce decree become vested in the recipient when they become
due."

(Citations omitted,) Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 57

(Utah 1983).

"Installments of support money vest as they become

due." (Citation omitted.) "The court has no power to modify the
Decree as to these vested rights, unless it finds that each element of equitable estoppel applies."
P.2d 147, 48 (Utah 1979).
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Adams v. Adams, 593

II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER SIGNED DECEMBER 7, 1987,
ARE CONTRARY TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
ON THE ISSUE OF POSSESSION AND VALUE OF THE SILVERWARE
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and court's
Order, simply do not reflect the evidence in the record on the
issues of possession and value of silverware.

With regard to the

silverware, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law state:
"In addition, the Defendant, between the time of the
trial of this matter on January 14, 1986, and the
entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree on July 14, 1986, went to the bank where
the parties had stored their silverware and removed
that silverware from the safety deposit box. The
Plaintiff believed that the silverware was worth
$10,000.00 while the Defendant believed that it was
worth approximately $4,500.00."
The "removal" of the silverware from the safety deposit box was
then used as a basis to modify the Decree of Divorce in that it
constituted a
"Substantial change of circumstance in that the
intent of the Court has been thwarted by events
resulting in the Defendant being awarded more than
one-half of the marital estate which requires, in
equity, a modification of the Decree and prior orders
and judgments of the Court, which, even after the
modification, results, the Court believes, in the
Defendant being awarded more than one-half of the
estate of the parties, thus, the court must modify
the Decree of Divorce and prior orders and
judgments of this court to provide that the
Defendant be awarded the silverware that she has
removed from the bank deposit box and taken into
her possession and the net proceeds of the sale of
the home of the parties and that upon payment to
her of the net proceeds of sale, that all prior
awards, judgments and Orders of the court requiring
payment to her should be deemed satisfied and paid
in full." (Record, p. 224, 225.)
The Court then files its Order:
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2. The Defendant is awarded all right, title
and interest of the parties to the silverware that
she has removed from the safety deposit box of the
parties during the pendency of the action.
(Record, p. 225.)
A.

Standard of Review and Findings of Fact,

Referring

to Rule 52(a) regarding the court's findings, the Utah Supreme
Court has held that the content of Subdivision (a)'s "clearly
erroneous" standard imported from the federal rule, requires that
if the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings will be set
aside.

Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v.

Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d 1376, 78 (Utah 1987).
B.

The Decree of Divorce Awarded Mrs. Jense the

Silverware.
At paragraph 4 of the Divorce Decree, the Court awards
personal property as follows:
"A. Plaintiff is awarded the Dasher automobile, the Cadillac automobile, the money in his
checking account and the furniture and furnishings
and other items of personal property currently in
his own possession except for the items specifically awarded to the Defendant as provided in the
next following subparagraph.
"B. Defendant is awarded the Ford automobile,
her retirement, the money in her checking account,
all the furniture and furnishings located in the
condominium at 29 South State Street, #718, Salt
Lake City, Utah, and the following items of furniture and personal property currently located in
the home occupied by the Plaintiff at 9200 North
4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah:" (Items deleted.)
Although the personal property provision does not make a
specific award of the silverware to Mrs. Jense, the award con-29-

templates that she will receive all items which are then in her
possession in her condominium at 29 South State Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah.

With regard to possession as of the date of Decree,

the evidence is unequivocal and it is clear from Mrs. Jense's
Affidavit and her Answers to Interrogatories that he knows she
was in possession of the silverware.
C.

The Evidence Clearly Shows Mrs. Jense Was in

Possession of the Silverware as of the Date of Decree.
The evidence before the Court on the issue of possession
of the silverware consisted of Mr. Jense's Affidavit (Record,
p. 163-165, attached hereto as Exhibit H, and Mrs. Jense's
Affidavit, attached hereto as Exhibit "M", Record, p. 268-274.)
Mr. Jense's Affidavit is totally silent as to the location of the
silverware as of July 9, 1986, on the date of the Decree, what
dates the silverware was located in the safety deposit box (other
than a vague three-year period), or the basis upon which he would
assert possession of the silverware as of the date of the Decree
of Divorce since he apparently assumed it was in the safety deposit box and "the Defendant was in charge of transferring the
silver from the home to the safety deposit box."
In contrast, the Plaintiff's "Verified Response" and the
Affidavit of Kay Jacobs, president of Deseret Bank where the
safety deposit box was located, unequivocally establish:

That on

July 9, 1986, the silverware was located in Mrs. Jense' condominium (para. 2 ) . She removed the silverware from the safety

-30-

deposit box in March, 1985, and took it to her condominium;

Kay

Jacobs testifies that the records of the bank show that the last
entry into the safety deposit box was March 5, 1985; and that the
silverware had been stored in the safety deposit box for only a
short period of time and that both Mr. and Mrs. Jense knew and
understood the silverware was the property of the Defendant
having been acquired prior to her marriage (para. 3 ) .

(Also, see

Mrs. Jense's Answer to Interrogatories, Exhibits "I" and "J"
hereto regarding location of silverware as of May 24, 1985.)
The Findings of Fact are absolutely contrary to the preponderance of the evidence as to possession on the date of
Decree, possession prior to the date of Decree, and date of removal from the safety deposit box.
D.

The Evidence Clearly Establishes the Value of the

Silverware at $4,417.50.
The only evidence before the court on the issue of value
was again the Affidavits of the parties.

Mr. Jense 1 s Affidavit

at paragraph 6 values the silverware at "approximately
$10,000.00."

However, this is based upon his own financial

statement submitted to First Interstate Bank on October 31, 1984,
which he alleged was "prepared by the Defendant" (Exhibit "H";
Record, p. 163-166).

He further acknowledges that "Plaintiff is

unable to determine the exact pieces in the safety deposit box."
(Para. 6.)

Mrs. Jense, in her Affidavit, at para. 4 states the

silverware is valued at $4,417.50 (Exhibit "M"; Record, p.
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268-274.)

This is based upon her itemization attached as

Exhibit "B" of each piece of silver and the retail price therefor
based upon the then-current suggested retail price taken from
the mail order price of "The Yankee Merchant Group and James
Kaplan Jewelers."
The Findings of Fact are erroneous in that they reflect
a $10,000.00 value on the silverware by the court in setting off
that value against that judgment of $43,417.46 awarded Mrs.
Jense.
This court should set aside the Findings of Fact on the
issues and the Order based thereon, especially where it was the
intent of the Order that Mrs. Jense receive those items of personal property located in her condominium on July 9, 1986.
III.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Mrs. Jense 1 s Motion for New Trial, pursuant to Rules 52
and 59 was prima facie well founded.

The Motions were made

November 5, 1987, after Mrs. Jense1s counsel belatedly received
the transcript from the hearing of April 14, 1987 (See
Introduction to Objection to Proposed Order and Motion for Trial,
Record, p. 227.)

Within the body of the Memoranda in Support of

New Trial and Objections to the Proposed Findings and Order,
counsel for the Defendant clearly explicated the legal propositions that the court had failed to follow Rule 9 of the
Supplementary Rules of Practice of the Third District Court
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thereby abusing its discretion (Point I, Memorandum, Record, p.
243-44); that there was not a substantial change in circumstance
warranting modification (Point II, Memorandum, Record, p.
244-45); and that the alimony award could not be set aside after
it had become vested April 1, 1987 (Point III, Memorandum,
Record, p. 246-47),

The Memorandum in support of the Objections

to the proposed Order also clearly explicated the reason why the
Findings of Fact did not reflect the preponderance of the evidence (see generally, Memorandum, Record, p.

239-47).

The

court, after review of the specific bases for a new trial should
have granted Mrs. Jense's Motion under Rule 59(a)(1) ("abuse of
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair
trial"), §(a)(6) ("insufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law"); and/or
§(a)(7) ("error in law").
Where the trial court's Order denying a Motion for a new
trial is a "clear abuse of discretion," the reviewing court
should reverse the trial court and remand for a new trial.
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977); Lembach v. Cox,
639 P.2d 187 (Utah 1981); Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's failure to follow Rule 9 of the
District Rules of Practice in and of itself justifies setting
aside the modification Order as an abuse of discretion which pre-
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vented normal and required response and discovery on the issues
presented, and an adequate hearing.

In addition, the Affidavit

and proffer of evidence presented at the August 24, 1987,
hearing, did not show a "substantial and compelling change in
circumstance" warranting abrogating the alimony, attorney's fees
and property award made to Mrs. Jense by the July 9, 1986, Decree
of Divorce.

It is further abundantly clear that the case law

establishes setting aside an accrued and vested alimony award is
an abuse of discretion.

This court should now rectify the errors

of the trial court by setting aside the court's Order of modification and setoff and remanding with instructions to reinstate
the judgment and for a new trial on all the issues, or in the
alternative, reinstating the Decree of Divorce.
C(
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EXHIBIT "A"

GARY W. JENSE V. SARA A. JENSE
Proposed Distribution of Assets and Liabilities

Description
*9200 North 4650 West
Pleasant Grove, Utah
(Value $150,000 less mtgs. of
$109,000)

Plaintiff
$41,000

$ 6,260

29 South State, #178
Salt Lake City, Utah
(Value $39,000 less mtg. of
$33,740)
582 West 850 North
Pleasant Grove, Utah
(Value $57,000 less mtgs. of
$46,900)

10,100

Furniture
Pleasant Grove
Salt Lake City

28,000

Vehicles
1980 Dasher
1984 Cadillac
1980 Ford

500
19,000

Checking Accounts
Zions Checking (H)
First Security Checking (W)
TOTAL ASSETS:
LIABILITIES (See attached sheet)

Payment to defendant for
cash-out value
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION TO EACH PARTY

Defendant

7,000
3,000

2,000

2,000
2,000

$100,600

$20,260

67,800

18,074

32,800

2,186

(15,307)

15,307

$ 17,493

$17,493

•Mortgage fluctuates because of revolving line of credit
52861

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT

"B"

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
GARY AND SARA JENSE

Assets

Sara

9200 No. 4650 West, Pleasant Grove
(Judd Harward appraisal $150,000
less mortgages Prudential $33,743;
Beneficial Finance $46,951;
Beneficial Revolving Credit $21,380.
Values from Plntf. Int. Ans. #12)
29 South State #718, Salt Lake City
(Webber appraisal $39,000 less
mortgage $32,738)

Gary

$ 47,926

$

6,262

582 West 850 North, Pleasant Grove
(Rental property; Harward appraisal
$57,000 less mortgages GE $26,900;
Fox $20,000. Plntf. Int. Ans. #12)

10,100

45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove
(Value $52,000 less mortgage $32,956;
property received by plaintiff
from father)

-0-

Tibble Fork, Utah County
(Value $60,000; property received
from plaintiff's father)

-0-

Furniture, Pleasant Grove

Gifted

28,555

(See list)
Furniture, Salt Lake City

3,185

1980 Dasher (value from plaintifffs
interrogatory answers)
1984 Cadillac ($22,800 value
purchased with $24,179 check out
of 1984 bonus)
1980 Ford (value from plaintiff's
interrogatory answers)

3,000

-03,000

Zion's checking (plaintiff's
financial declaration)
First Security checking

2,000
2,000

Federal retirement ($3,600 dovetails
with Social Security)

EXHIB

Gary

Sara

Assets
1985 Bonus (Gross bonus $85,000;
net paid $70,304)

$

1986 bonus currently earned
to be paid in March, 1986

70,304

?

Proceeds, sale of stock
T-Bond futures (date of sale
5/11/84 for $60,002)
Loss carryover of $20,100
assuming tax liability of 50%

10jer50

Liabilities:
Student loan liability
($25,175 less prats $5,468)
Installment obligations
(See exhibit of expenses)

$(19,707)

(14,579)

Zion's Bank loan (fin. decl.)

( 8,844)

First Security Financial
(fin. decl.)

(32,956)

TOTALS

$(19,839)

$130,135

Payment by plaintiff to
defendant to equalize values

+ 74,987

- 74,987

NET DISTRIBUTION

$ 55,148

$ 55,148

4/J7
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EXHIBIT "C"
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B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
Suite 1330
310 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:

H

'-"'

(801) 521-6383

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
GARY W. JENSE,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. D85-702

SARA A. JENSE,

Judge Daniels

Defendant.
oooOooo

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
on the 14th day of January, 1986, plaintiff appearing in person
and by his attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appearing
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and each of the
parties having testified to matters in their respective complaint
and counterclaim and the matter having been argued and submitted
and taken under advisement by the Court, and the Court now being
fully advised hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1,

Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State

of Utah, and has been for more than three months immediately
prior to the filing of this action for divorce.

EXHIBIT C

2.

Plaintiff and defendant were married in Las Vegas,

Nevada on the 10th day of January, 1953, and since that time have
been husband and wife.
3.

Plaintiff has treated defendant cruelly, causing

her great mental suffering and distress.

Among other things,

plaintiff has failed to meet defendant's emotional needs and
include her in the financial decisions of the marriage, which
conduct has made it impossible for defendant to continue with the
marriage relationship and entitles defendant to a decree of
divorce from plaintiff on her counterclaim.
4.

Plaintiff and defendant have four children as

issue of this marriage, all of whom are adults and emancipated,
and there are no issues of custody or support.
5.

The real property of the parties should be awarded

as follows:
a.

Plaintiff should be awarded the equity of the

parties in the house and real property at 9200 North 4650 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities
outstanding thereon; the rental home at 582 West 850 North,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities
outstanding thereon; the Tibbie Fork property and the residence
at 45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to plaintiff
assuming and paying the outstanding mortgage owing thereon.
b.

Defendant should be awarded the condominium

at 29 South State Street #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to
2

the mortgage outstanding thereon.
6.

The personal property of the parties should be

awarded as follows:
a.

Plaintiff should be awarded the Dasher

automobile, the Cadillac automobile, the money in his checking
account, and the furniture and furnishings and other items of
personal property currently in his own possession except for the
items specifically awarded to defendant as provided in the next
following subparagraph.
b.

Defendant should be awarded the Ford

automobile, her retirement, the money in her checking account,
all the furniture and furnishings located in the condominium at
29 South State #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the following
items of furniture and personal property currently located in the
home occupied by plaintiff at 9200 North 4650 West, Pleasant
Grove, Utah:
Large antique copper frying pan
Antique church pew
French Provincial armchair
Nantucket rocking chair
Antique frame sampler
Hummel figurines
Bowl from Israel
Silver hurricane lamp

3

Small spinning wheel planter
Collection of antique spoons
Sterling silver goblets
Silver chafing dish
Antique cradle
Rocking chair
Bicentennial pewter plates
Poster bed
Bowl and pitcher (gift from Aunt Louise
Watts)
Antique quilt/antique valentines
Antique quilt from defendant's grandmother
Moiri chair
Cross-stitch quilt
Bowl and pitcher (gift from defendant's
sister)
Four Lladro figurines
Various Royal Doulton figurines
Collection of "Coalport Cottages"
Defendant's clothing and personal effects,
including personal papers, books and items
which came from her family such as photograph
albums, diaries and similar personal items.
7.

The parties should agree upon a time when defendant

can receive from plaintiff the items of property to be awarded to
defendant which are currently in plaintiff's possession, which

4

time should be consistent with the schedule of the daughter of
the parties who is to arrange to pick up the items for defendant.
8.

The obligations and liabilities of the parties

should be assumed and paid as follows:
a.

Plaintiff should assume and pay the

various mortgage obligations owing on the real properties awarded
to him, the Zion's First National Bank note liability shown on
plaintiff's Exhibit P-l, any income tax liability for his 1985
income, and any obligations which he has individually incurred
since the separation of the parties in June, 1984.
b.

Defendant should assume and pay her student

loan, her installment obligations, and any obligations which she
has individually incurred since the separation of the parties in
June, 1984.
9.

In order to equalize the marital estate, defendant

should be awarded a judgment from plaintiff in the sura of $27,750
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% from February 24,
1986, until paid in full.

This obligation should be paid by

plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, and until paid this
obligation should constitute a lien against plaintiff's real
property located in Utah County as provided in paragraph 5a above.
10.

As an alimony award from plaintiff to defendant,

plaintiff should pay defendant an amount equal to one-half of the
gross bonus earned by plaintiff in 1985 which will be received in

5

1986, and upon receipt of the bonus, one-half of the gross bonus
should be paid to defendant.
11.

The Court finds that defendant based upon her

current employment is capable of supporting herself and for this
reason, the Court does not award permanent alimony.

However,

based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties,
plaintiff should pay to defendant temporary alimony in order to
give defendant the opportunity to establish herself, which
alimony should be in the amount of $500 per month for a period of
one-year commencing with the month of March, 1986, and with each
installment to be due and payable on the 1st day of the month.
Because of plaintiff's current financial
circumstances, however, defendant should engage in no action to
reduce these installments to judgment or enforce payment thereof
through execution until April 1, 1987, in order to allow
plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus for the 1986
income year.

Each installment of alimony should bear interest

from the date when due until paid at the rate of 10% per annum,
and if by April 1, 1987 any installments have not been paid, then
defendant should be entitled to reduce any unpaid installments to
judgment and enforce collection through execution.
12.

In light of the disparity of the incomes and the

current financial circumstances of the parties, plaintiff should
be required to pay defendant's attorney's fees in the amount of
$5,000 together with all costs including appraisal costs incurred
6

by defendant in the sum of $670.

The obligation for attorney's

fees and costs should be due and payable by April 1, 1987 and
shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum until paid.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant is entitled to a divorce from plaintiff

on the grounds of mental cruelty, which decree shall be final
upon signing and entry.
2.

The real property of the parties is awarded as

provided in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact.
3.

The personal property of the parties is awarded as

provided in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact.
4.

The liabilities of the parties are to be assumed

and paid as provided in paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact.
5.

Defendant is awarded a judgment from plaintiff in

the amount of $27,750 as property settlement to equalize the
marital estate plus interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per
annum from February 24, 1986, until paid in full, with payment to
be made upon the terms and to be secured as provided in paragraph
9 of the Findings of Fact.
6.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant an

alimony award equal to one-half of the gross bonus earned by
plaintiff in 1985 which will be received in 1986, and upon

7

receipt of the bonus, plaintiff is ordered to pay one-half of the
gross bonus to defendant.
7.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant temporary

alimony in the amount of $500 per month for a period of one-year
commencing with the month of March, 1986, to be paid upon the
terms provided in paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact.
8.

Defendant is awarded a judgment for the use and

benefit of her attorney in the amount of $5,000 together with
costs in the amount of $670 incurred by defendant in this
divorce proceeding, to be paid upon the terms provided in
paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact.
9.

Each of the parties is ordered to execute any

documents necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of
Divorce when it is entered.
DATED this &\

day of

\J -» V l/

> 1986.

BY THE COURT:

9

By

WJ^~1^

/

DISTRICT JUDGE

!>W**HIIAIL,ING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the

day of

, 1986,

I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law to:
David S. Dolowitz
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorney for Defendant.
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EXHIBIT "D"

[JUDGMENT / ^-'.-.:.B. L. DART ( 8 1 8 )

f 1Q«r
"CD

Attorney for Defendant
Suite 1330
310 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
GARY W. JENSE,

Plaintiff,

:

;>£

£0%

"7 ~ M - £fe

^C'

,0 f

^

/£• '. ^8

^ ^

:
DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.

:

SARA A. JENSE,

:

Civil No. D85-702

:

Judge Daniels

Defendant.

oooOooo
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
on the 14th day of January, 1986, plaintiff appearing in person
and by his attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appearing
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and each of the
parties having testified to matters in their respective complaint
and counterclaim and the matter having been argued and submitted
and taken under advisement by the Court, and the Court having
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now

therefore,

EXHIBIT D

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendant is awarded a decree of divorce from

plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty, which decree for good
cause shown shall be final upon signing and entry,
2.

Plaintiff and defendant have four children as

issue of this marriage, all of whom are adults and emancipated,
and there are no issues of custody or support.
3.

The real property of the parties is awarded

as follows:
a.

Plaintiff is awarded the equity of the

parties in the house and real property at 9200 North 4650 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities
outstanding thereon; the rental home at 582 West 850 North,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities
outstanding thereon; the Tibbie Fork property; and the residence
at 45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to plaintiff
assuming and paying the outstanding mortgage owing thereon.
b.

Defendant is awarded the condominium

at 29 South State Street #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to
the mortgage outstanding thereon.
4.

The personal property of the parties is awarded as

follows:
a.

Plaintiff is awarded the Dasher automobile,

the Cadillac automobile, the money in his checking account, and
2

the furniture and furnishings and other items of personal
property currently in his own possession except for the items
specifically awarded to defendant as provided in the next
following subparagraph.
b.

Defendant is awarded the Ford automobile, her

retirement, the money in her checking account, all the furniture
and furnishings located in the condominium at 29 South State
#718, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the following items of furniture
and personal property currently located in the home occupied by
plaintiff at 9200 North 4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah:
Large antique copper frying pan
Antique church pew
French Provincial armchair
Nantucket rocking chair
Antique frame sampler
Hummel figurines
Bowl from Israel
Silver hurricane lamp
Small spinning wheel planter
Collection of antique spoons
Sterling silver goblets
Silver chafing dish
Antique cradle

3

Rocking chair
Bicentennial pewter plates
Poster bed
Bowl and pitcher (gift from Aunt Louise
Watts)
Antique quilt/antique valentines
Antique quilt from defendant's grandmother
Moiri chair
Cross-stitch quilt
Bowl and pitcher (gift from defendant's
sister)
Four Lladro figurines
Various Royal Doulton figurines
Collection of "Coalport Cottages"
Defendant's clothing and personal effects,
including personal papers and books and items
which came from her family such as photograph
albums, diaries and similar personal items.
5.

The parties are ordered to agree upon a time when

defendant can receive from plaintiff the items of property to be
awarded to defendant which are currently in plaintiff's
possession, which time should be consistent with the schedule of
the daughter of the parties who shall arrange to pick up the
items for defendant.
6.

The obligations and liabilities of the parties

are to be assumed and paid as follows:

4

a.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the

various mortgage obligations owing on the real properties awarded
to him, the Zion's First National Bank note liability shown on
plaintiff's Exhibit P-l, any income tax liability for his 1985
income, and any obligations which he has individually incurred
since the separation of the parties in June, 1984.
b.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay her

student loan, her installment obligations, and any obligations
which she has individually incurred since the separation of the
parties in June, 1984.
7.

In order to equalize the marital estate, defendant

is awarded a judgment from plaintiff in the sum of $27,750
together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% from
February 24, 1986, until paid in full.

This obligation is

ordered to be paid by plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, and
until paid this obligation shall constitute a lien against
plaintiff's real property located in Utah County as provided in
paragraph 3a above.
8.

As an alimony award from plaintiff to defendant,

plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant an amount equal to one-half
of the gross bonus earned by plaintiff in 1985 which will be
received in 1986, and upon receipt of the bonus, one-half of the
gross bonus is ordered to be paid to defendant.

5

9.

No permanent alimony is awarded, but plaintiff is

ordered to pay to defendant temporary alimony in the amount of
$500 per month for a period of one-year commencing with the month
of March, 1986, with each installment due and payable on the 1st
day of the month.
Because of plaintiff's current financial
circumstances, however, defendant is ordered to engage in no
action to reduce these installments to judgment or enforce
payment thereof through execution until April 1, 1987, in order
to allow plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus for
the 1986 income year*

Each installment of alimony shall bear

interest from the date when due until paid at the rate of 10% per
annum, and if by April 1, 1987 any installments have not been
paid, then defendant shall be entitled to reduce any unpaid
installments to judgment and enforce collection through
execution,
10.

Defendant is awarded a judgment for the use and

benefit of her attorney in the amount of $5,000 plus costs
including all appraisal costs incurred by defendant in this
proceeding in the amount of $670.

This obligation for attorney's

fees and costs shall be due and payable by April 1, 1987 and
shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum until paid.

6

11.

Each of the parties is ordered to execute any

documents necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of
Divorce when it is entered.
\

DATED this

day of

O

U.

[

1986.

-y-

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST

Ji^oi^d,^,

.uwCy^jL
DISTRICT JUDGE

*w*

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of

1986, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to:
David S. Dolowitz
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorney for Defendant.
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EXHIBIT "E"

A t t o r n e y f o r . P l a i n t i f f t^QndWuu!^
142 E a s t 200 S o u t h
Guardian P l a z a S u i t e 311
/
riltUlWttlKft^tff
r
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h
84111
/
I'•* i.tfi rMtiv
Telephone: (801) 532-3020
:
w

J

/

IN THE THRID JUDICIAL DISTRICT COIART IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

\ y.

..

LY Usfy
' ' "'*'1 ' ' "

STATE OF UTAH' ~

;'

y

'f.*u
"
\

GARY W. JENSE,
J U D G M E N T

Plaintiff,
vs.
SARA A.

Civil

JENSE,

No.

Judge:

D85-702
Daniels

Defendant(s)

-ooOoo-

H ^ - ^ ^ . ^
^

Hearing was set in the above entitled court and came on
for hearing on the 14th day of January , 19*36, before the
Honorable Judge Daniels. Plaintiff being represented by its
Attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and Defendant(s) ^flft being
represented her attorney B. L. Dart; the Court having heard the
arguments from present parties, being fully advised in the
premises, now therefore:

_

*

*

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that MUJULI 1 f-g is granted Judgment
against RaCuuJai'iNp( a) for the principal sum of Forty Three
Thousand Three Hundred and Fourteen Dollars and Forty-Six Cents.
($43,314.46.), all court costs to and from the date of
Judgement, interest at the rate of 12% and after accuring costs,
attorney's fees.
BY THE COURT:

y^Q ^ c '

l i ' ^ f f

EXHIBIT E

\
^kuajj^4
ITT DANIELS
HONORABLE SCOTT

ATTEST/
<~-l...

Jk^

',/C\
\

page two of two
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the above foregoing Judgment as follows: David S. Dolowitz at:
Box 11898, Salt Lake City, Utah

84147.

q-Ko

Dean
Legal Assistarvt

&
ITEMIZATION OF JUDGMENT

R|
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II os AM'87

1. JUDGMENT in the amount of $2'
! 7,7 sW0ti±ici_sa^4
paragraph seven (7) of Defendant's Decree of Divorce affopg with
interest in the amount of $3,607.59 (12% from February 24, 1986
to date.)
2. ALIMONY in the amount of $5,549.80 as awarded in
paragraph nine (9) of Defendant's Decree of Divorce. See below:
12 months alimony @ $500.00 = $6,000.00
Payments received
-500.00
Interest @10%
49.80
$5,549.80
3. ATTORNEY'S FEES in the amount of $5,000.00 as awarded in
paragraph ten (10) of Defendant's Decree of Divorce and interest
at the rate of 10% per annum until paid. Interest in the amount
of $737.10 has accrued to date. Court costs in the amount of $670.00.
THEREFORE JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS:
1.
2.

$31,357.56
5,549.80

3.

5>7 3 7 . 1 0
$43,314.46

and Costs $670.00

EXHIBIT "F"

1

and the time in research, so I think an hour of it could

2

be attributed to being new counsel in the case.

3

would have been incurred whether I was old or new counsel.

4

THE COURT:

Okay.

The balance

Well, I think in light of

5

the testimony presented, I am going to grant the stay of

5

execution for four months only.

7

award attorneys fees to the defendant as partial payment

8

for her attorneys fees in the amount of $600.

9

10
11
12
13
14

15

And I am also going to

In the meantime, the plaintiff will be directed
not to sell or encumber any of his real property or personal
property without —

obviously he is trying to sell the house.

I am not saying he can't do that.

I am saying that he

can't sell it without immediately accounting to the defendant
through her counsel and keeping them informed of any sales
of either the real or personal property.

16

If he hasn't got the home sold and is in a

17

position to pay the judgment in four months, then I am

18

19

going to be very disinclined to grant another stay,
MR. DOLOWITZ:

I would like to indicate to

20

the Court I would like to pursue the question of the silver

21

and bring that back before you and request a $10,000 credit

22

for her taking the silver.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

I think you are certainly entitled

to bring that before the Court.
MR. DOLOWITZ:

Can we request attorneys fees

51
J

FXHIBIT F

EXHIBIT "G"

fuep w.ctFw* erritt
ULUAKt

6CUHTT.UTAU

Jw2«i 4i?PH*87
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE £• LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

Dir:*

t uCR*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

GARY W. JENSE
MOTION
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. D85-702
Judge Scott Daniels

SARA A. JENSE,
Defendant,

* * * * * * * *

This court, on the 9th day of July, 1986, entered a
Decree of Divorce ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant
certain sums of money.

Execution on those sums was thereafter

stayed until April 1, 1987.

On April 1, 1987, a Judgment in the

sum of $43,314.46 was entered

in favor of the defendant and

against the plaintiff to effectuate all of the ordered payments.
The defendant, after the entry of the Decree of Divorce, went to
the safety-deposit box of the parties and removed from that,
silver

which

Accordingly,

the
the

plaintiff

plaintiff

has

moves

valued

this

court

at
to

$10,000.00.
require

the

defendant to enter a satisfaction of judgment for $10,000.00 of

EXHIB

X

0o

«/.

the

$43,314.46

furniture,

fixtures,

specifically
plaintiff

to

her

on

the

furnishings

enumerated

in

and

the

basis

that

all

of

appliances, except

Decree

were

awarded

to

the
those
the

and that included the silver which has been taken by

the defendant
allow her

owed

from the plaintiff.

The plaintiff

is willing to

to retain the silver, but wishes to require her to

enter the Partial Satisfaction of Judgment requested herein based
on her taking possession of that property.
DATED this jj£

day of

., 1987.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Plaintiff
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that

I caused to be mailed, postage

prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to the
following on this 2. */-"day of

V/-^^--~--^?

1987:

Craig M. Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
428 South 5th East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ

FT:061887A

-2-

EXHIBIT "H"

« L W IN.CURK'S OFFtCt
SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147-0898
Telephone:
(801) 532-1234

ton u)B!:!^ff\nM.

tj)rc*n

DL p L-Jr C L E R K

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

GARY W. JENSE

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT

)

SARA A. JENSE,

)
)
)

Defendant.

Civil No. D85-702
Judge Scott Daniels

* * * * * * * *

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

GARY W. JENSE being duly sworn deposes and states:
1.

I am the plaintiff

in the above-entitled matter.

2.

A Decree of Divorce was granted

to the parties

by the above-entitled court on July 9, 1986.
3.

During

the marriage

there was a safety deposit

box at Deseret Bank of Pleasant Grove containing several serving
pieces and place settings of Grand Baroque silver which had been
purchased

by

the

parties

during

the

marriage

or

given

plaintiff and defendant as gifts.

EXHIBIT H

to

the

4.

This silver had been used by the family for

special dinners and other occasions.
5.

Because of the value of this silver, the safety

deposit box was obtained

and the silver was kept

in it for

approximately three years.
6.

The silver removed by the Defendant from the

safety deposit box is valued at approximately $10,000.00.

Since

the defendant was in charge of transferring the silver from the
home to the safety deposit box, Plaintiff is unable to determine
the exact pieces in the safety deposit box.
First

Interstate Bank

Exhibit

Financial

Statement

Please see copy of
attached hereto as

"A", prepared by Defendant stating the value of the

silver.
7.

On April 1, 1987 a judgment was entered against

me in the sum of $43,314.46, as a result of the ordered payments
from the Decree of Divorce.
8.

I am willing to allow the defendant to keep the

contents of the safety deposit box, but would require from the
defendant a partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of
$10,000.00.
DATED this 2-±£ day of

'<&^u^_
/
/

GARY W./JENSE

-2-

1987.

1

f

V '- U

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
., 1987.
)H.

^c J
\\h

NOTARY /PIJBL:3c
Residing at : :\.MltX.-l;L

My Commission Expires:

day oi

i.ij^L

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT to

7X
the following on this 9 ^—- day of
Craig M. Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
428 South 5th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
FT:061887B
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EXHIBIT

"I"

(g)
14.

Not applicable,

Describe all bank or other institution in which

your name did not apear but in which you deposited money within
the last two years and please state with respect to each such
account:
ANSWER;
(1V4) None,
15.

Have there been bank or other institution accounts

in which your name does not appear, but from which you withdrew
money in the last two years?
ANSWER:

£57 NO,
16.

If the answer to the preceding Interrogatory is in

the affirmative, please state with respect to each account:
ANSWER:
(lo) Is not applicable^J2>
17.

Identify and describe any^afety deposit boxes,

vaults, safes or other places of deposit or safekeepT&^-in which
you have deposited any item of value during the last five years
and for each such deposit, state the following:
a.

The name and address of the institution or

entity where the deposit is located;
b.

The identification or account number;

EXHIBIT I

c.

The name and address of each person

authorized to enter the deposit;
d.

Whether the deposit is still open, and,

e.

State with specificity each item located

within the deposit and its present value.
ANSWER:
(17) (a)

Deseret Bank, Pleasant Grove, Utah, 84062.

(b)

Unknown.

(c)

Sara A. Jense, and Lana Jense Bowles, 10 South

3rd East, Pleasant Grove, Utah

84062.

(d) Yes.
(e)

There are no items in the box and plaintiff

has the keys.
18.

Identify any and all real property which you own

or owned an interest at any time durinig your present marxiage,
stating for each parcel of property;
a.

The street address and legal description;

b.

The size;

c.

A description of each building, structure or

other improvement presently on the property;
d.

The method of acquisition of title;

e.

The date of acquisition;

f.

The name and address of the seller or person

from whom title was acquired;
10

EXHIBIT "J"

Attachment No. 2
9200 North 4650 West, Utah County, All in Plaintiff's possession
I.

Entry Hall
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

II.

Antique wooden rocking horse
Antique church pew - gift to defendant from friend
Large wall hanging school clock
Large antique copper frying pan circa 1585 - gift to
defendant from parents
Various framed watercolors, prints, accessories
Silver-plated silver bell collection "The Twelve Days
of Christmas"

Living Room
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Large corner cupboard - Christmas gift to defendant
from plaintiff
Red velvet couch
Two end tables
Two lamps
Lighted curio cabinet - Christmas gift to defendant
from plaintiff
Pair of large wooden candlesticks
French provincial arm chair - gift to defendant from
parents
Nantucket rocking chair - gift to defendant from father
Round skirted table
Piano - gift to plaintiff from mother
Two piece stereo set - one piece gift to plaintiff
from mother
Large "flax" antique spinning wheel - Christmas gift
from defendant to plaintiff
Antique framed sampler - gift to defendant from
Freda Brey
Pair of glass Venetian figurines
Four antique glass shoes
Four Lladro figurinies - gifts to defendant for
Mother's Day, anniversaries, etc.
Various Royal Doulton figurines - gifts to defendant
for various occassions
Collection of bells - limited editions, silver and china
Collection of "Coalport Cottages" - gifts to defendant
for various occassions
Numerous pictures, accessories, antique artifacts, etc.
Collection of Hummel figurines - gifts to defendant
from mother, children, friends

EXHIBIT J
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EXHIBIT "L"

F,UC IN CORK'S OFFICE
SALTUXE "-JKTX.U.Ah

AUG
DAVID S .

DOLOWITZ

3 3 m PH '81

(0899)

of and f o r
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
185 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t , S u i t e 700
P . O . Box 11898
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84147-0898
Telephone:
(801) 5 3 2 - 1 2 3 4

DLTJ:^ CLEM

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

GARY W. JENSE
PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT
Plaintiff,
vs.
SARA A, JENSE,

Civil No. D85-702
Judge Scott Daniels
Defendant.
* * * * * * * *

STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
GARY W. JENSE being duly sworn deposes and states:
1.

I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter.

2.

A Decree of Divorce was granted to the parties

by the above-entitled court on July 9, 1986.
3.

Pursuant

to paragraph

3(a) of

the Decree of

Divorce, plaintiff was awarded the home of the parties at 9200
North 4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah.
4.

Plaintiff

has

had

the

home

for

sale

for

approximately six (6) months but due to the depressed real estate

EXHIBIT L

market in Utah County, the house has not sold and plaintiff has
been

told

by

plaintiff

several

will

real

receive

estate

from

the

agents
sale

that
of

the

the

net

home

amount

will

be

Decree

of

approximately $119,0 00,00.
5.

Plaintiff

since

the

entry

of

the

Divorce has serviced the significant debt on the property as well
as marital

debts

during

the

pendency

of

the

divorce

to

the

present time as set out in detail in Exhibit A attached hereto.
6.

Due to plaintiff's employer merging with Zions

Mortgage Company, plaintiff's

employment

was

terminated

as of

July 17, 1987.
7.

Plaintiff received $2400.00 on July 17, 1987 and

$3700.00 on July 30, 1987 as severance pay.

There is presently a

dispute over an additional $1,000.00 owed to plaintiff.

Please

see documentation attached to support severance pay received.
8.

Plaintiff is in need of severance pay received

to service debts and pay living expenses as outlined in paragraph
5 above and Exhibit B attached hereto.

If the debts outlined in

paragraph 5 above are not serviced, both plaintiff and defendant
will be liable.
9.
for

15

$72,000.

years

Plaintiff has been employed by American Equity
and

received

bonuses

ranging

There was no bonus paid for 1986.

-2-

from

$10,000

to

DATED this ^

u*.{

day of August, 1987.

GARY Wy JENSE//
Subscribed and sworn to before me this y,^^^
July, 1987.

day of

JOTARY PUBJ#C
NOTARY
^_. „£/ , <?
My Commission E x p i r e s :

<e~i-

Residing at: ^*J J

fi

/''/'

PI
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage

prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT to
-~~ day of August, 1987:
Craig M. Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
428 South 5th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
FT:070787D
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"EXHIBIT A"
JENSE V. JENSE
MARITAL DEBTS SERVICED BY PLAINTIFF
(INCLUDED IN EXHIBIT B)
Monthly Payment
9200 West
4650 West

$1,748.57

Repayment on
daughter's school
loan

742.00

Pleasant Grove
Rental Property Receives $275
toward payment of $504.

229.00

$2,719.57 —

Monthly Debt
Obligation

Since July, 1986, Plaintiff has paid — $32,634.84
(primarily interest — little principal reduction)
FT070787D

"EXHIBIT B"
GARY W. JENSE V. SARA A. JENSE
^

-

,

•

k *

• •

PLAINTIFF'S MONTHLY EXPENSES
Husband
Mortgage payments
Real property insurance
Maintenance
Food and household supplies
Utilities
Telephone
Laundry and cleaning
Clothing
***Medical and dental
Entertainment
Incidentals
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance)
Installment payment(s)
TOTAL EXPENSES

$*1,748.57
**
**
200.00
250.00
40.00
50.00
50.00
200.00
10 0.00
25.00
300.00
1,121.00
$4,0 84.57

*Includes first and second mortgage
**Included in mortgage payments
***Because of unemployment, plaintiff is responsible for
payment
**** $ 150.00 Credit Cards
742.00 Repayment daughter's school loan (Holly)
229.00 Rental property, Pleasant Grove - (Net)
FT070787D

ZIONS BANCORPORATION
1380 KENNEGOTT BUILDING
SALT LAKE GITY, UTAH 8 4 1 3 3
(801) 5 2 4 - 4 7 8 7
HARRIS

H.

SIMMONS

PRESIDENT

July 28, 1987

Mr. Gary Jense
P. 0. Box 422
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
Dear Gary:
As per our discussion the other day, I am enclosing a check representing
additional severance pay for 304 hours of work. This brings the total,
including the 160 hours paid two weeks ago, to 464 hours. This is 40 hours
short of the amount you had requested. The shortfall represents 40 hours
of sick leave pay. As a company, we have never paid unused sick leave to
any terminated employees under any circumstances. Inasmuch as this liability
had not been accrued by American Equity, and inasmuch as this is not a benefit
which we would provide for any of our own terminated employees, we cannot
justify a payment for those hours.
I want to wish you well in all of your endeavors. Though the circumstances
under which we found ourselves working together were somewhat difficult, we
appreciate the help you rendered in the aftermath of the purchase of the
Foothill Financial assets. Best wishes.
Sincerely,

Harris H. Simmons
President
HHSrmm
enclosure

1380 KENNECOTT BUILDING
ZIONS
FIRST NATIONAL

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84133

BANK

31-5
1240

ONE S O U T H M A I N STREET

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH
}ATE

July 29,

>AY
;DEH

r

19&7ZiOtfS*.

M&lffi™ 3 7 5 9rfni's€ 8 ct

$ 3 , 759.68

~l

GARY JENSE

L

ZIONS

BANCDRPDRATIDN

J

N FULL PAYMENT OF SEVERANCE CLAIMS

"'0 2 5S?3»' •: I 21,0000 SMI OE
*J*J==?5L7,**.m.*^2B&z^tj*» — ^ T Z <

DATE

r i i ^ f f ; - i«*JZ&?~*

itm^l

VEND./EMPL. PAYEE
^6~

7-29-87

rSjUECSs&S*. K J L i « ^ x

RPUKATtON

M«

DETACH THIS STATEMENT BEFORE DEPOSITING CHECK.

71

GARY JENSE
DESCRIPTION
304 HOURS GROSS 80A0.80 FICA 574.92
2556.00 ST 1150.20 NET 3759.68

INVOICE NUMBER

IONS

1 1 0 0 3 Rw

• «rs«5^-r«^C3B5T-^*•

DESCRIPTION TO BE KEY PUNCHED

Z K N S P.ANC0RF0RATI0N
1 SOUTH MAIN STFEET SALT LAKE CITY, UT

N2

2587

NET AMOUNT:

3,759.68

64111

STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS
EARNINGS

HRSAINITS

FTM'LAR
VACATION

AMOUNT

7*\

FICA TAX
2327
2115 69 STATE UT
LIFE INS

eojro

|

DEDUCTIONS

|

1172159
317,61 FED TAX
o;fo
527J66 MEP INS
0il2
CJ14 ADCC INS
1
(l
1
1
I

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
l

TOTAL EARNINGS

YEAR TO DATE
GROSS PAY
F.I.C.A
FED TAX
STATE T A X

I
l
I
i
1
1
1

J

1
1
1

1

i
l

J

1

GARY K JFNSE

FOR PERIOD ENDING

Ql~30

~B1

ZICKS EANCCFPORATION

710NS PANCCFPORATION
1 SOUTH MAIN STREET SALT LAKE C I T Y , UT
INS EANCGRPORATICN

84111

AMOUNT

>ATE

KEKOPANDUK

£*2424.03

755JENSE, GARY K
GARY W JENSE
, f-y v

/.

n «

ejco
eeico
1
1

TEMl

1

62,13
11
1
1
1
1

2018S? 1 ^f?!MEf;i»AV^ :-•••>
2424.C3
415 755 000005 26 4096 40

TOTAL DEDUCTIONS

4 44 2 * ^ 1

07-3C-87

SICK
VAC

169 2515 2
1205|73
435813
196 1|14

EXHIBIT "M"

CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579
Attorney for Defendant
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
GARY W. JENSE,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

v.

)

SARA A. JENSE,

)
)
)

Defendant.

VERIFIED REPLY TO
PLAINTIFFfS MOTION

Civil No. D85-702
(Judge Scott Daniels)

ooOoo
The Plaintiff above named filed a Motion with this Court
dated June 24, 1987, seeking relief in the form of a reduction of
the Judgment heretofore entered in this matter in the amount of
$43,314.46 by $10,000.00 for personal property in the form of
silverware.
1.

The Defendant replies to said Motion as follows:
The Decree of Divorce entered in this matter

provides at paragraph 4b that the Defendant is awarded all furniture and furnishings located in the condominium at 29 South
State, #718, Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce,

July 9, 1986, the silverware was located in the condominium.
silverware was removed from the safety deposit box in March,
1985, and taken at that time to Defendant's condominium.

EXHIBIT M

The

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is the Affidavit of Kay L. Jacobs,
the keeper of records for the bank where the safety deposit box
is located showing that the last time anyone had access to the
safety deposit was Marchf 1985.
3.

The silverware had been stored in a safety deposit

box for only a short time because there had been a series of
thefts in the neighborhood where the parties resided at the time
of their separation.

Each of the parties knew and understood

that the silverware was the property of the Defendant having been
acquired by her prior to the marriage of the parties and each
understood that she had possession of it and would retain its
ownership.
4.

In any event, the value of the silverware is not

$10,000.00 as stated by the Plaintiff and supported by a
Financial Declaration which he prepared and signed.
value of the silverware is $4,417.50.

The actual

See Exhibit "B", Statement

of Suggested Retail Value.
5.

It has been necessary for the Defendant to acquire

the services of an attorney to represent her in defending against
the Motion of the Plaintiff which has been unreasonably brought
before this Court and it is reasonable that she be awarded such
attorney's fees and costs as she may incur in the defense of this
Motion.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintiff's Motion be
dismissed, that he take nothing thereby and that Defendant be

-2-

awarded her attorney's fees and costs which she may have incurred
in these proceedings.
DATED this

day of August, 1987.

CRAIG M. PETERSON
Attorney for Defendant

\>l/L-i* A . V^Vw-A
M
SARA A. JENSE/ /
Defendant
\
VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SARA A. JENSEf being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and says that she has read the above and foregoing Verified Reply
to Plaintiff's Motion and knows and understands the contents
thereof and the same is true as to her own knowledge except to
those matters herein stated upon information and belief and as
to those matters, she believes the same to be true.
VA:.?

K

A-

)l

i-.J^K

SARA A. JENSE'
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Zj
August, 1987.

'
• • [•'

,
A

'.,,,.
u

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

day of

f? '('A.

•.-•;•' : •

C-t'- •-!

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Verified Reply to Plaintiff's
Motion to David S. Dolowitz, Attorney for Plaintiff, 185 South
State Street, Suite 700, Post Office Box 11898, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84147-0898, this '/•&

day of August, 1987.

21753

-4-

CRAIG M. PETERSON
Attorney for Defendant
426 South Fifth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-30435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
GARY W. JENSE,
A F F I D A V I T
of
Kay L. J a c o b s

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. D85-702

SARA A. JENSE,
Defendants,
)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

*
—ooOoo—

STATE OF UTAH

ss.

COMES NOW Kay L. Jacobs being first duly sworn,
deposes, and states as follows:
1.

That he is the President of Deseret Bank.

2.

That in the normal course of business he

supervises, among other things, the safety deposit boxes and the
books and records thereof.
3.

That he is personally familiar with the records

regarding box #370.<^«<r/ ^ c r ^ ^ "2i£. 4/
4.

& S i*fe

That on April 16, 1982 box #370^was assigned to and

access was granted as follows: Sara Jense, Gary Jense, and Lana
Bowles.
5.

That the last recorded visit, made to box #370,^ was ^ |

on March 22, 1985, at the hour of 10:45 a.m.

EXHIBIT A

-page two of two-

6.

j

That the last rental payment, on box #370,/ was

I
t

received February 6, 1985. Said payment secured box to December
31, 1985.
7.

That on February
request was received, by
reoruary 18,
±o, 1986
I^OD req
the bank, that box #3'
I70^be closed. *'y
8.

That statements made and facts contained herein are

based upon personal knowledge and substantiated by bank records.
DATED this / ^ ^ day of August, 1987.

Kay L. J a c o b s /
P r e s i d e n t of D e s e r e t Bank
66 South Main
Pleasant Grove, Utah

84062

Subscribed and sworn to before me this '^J&e!y of
August, 1987.
Notary P u l ^ l i c . / ! .
~7
R e s i d i n g i n : Z^f/r^JY</ff
My Commission E x p i r e s : J /fa W///V£ '->'d- /*/?{?

I /
O^k/-/^

CURRENT VALUE - SUGGESTED RETAIL FROM MANUFACTURER
SILVER - GRAND BAROQUE PATTERN
WALLACE SILVERSMITHS
, 4 piece place settings @ $320.00 =

$2,560.00

*4 piece place setting consists of
teaspoon, place knife, place fork
and salad fork.
cream soup spoons © $90.00 =

720.00

ice cream spoons i $95.00 =

285.00

butter spreaders © $80.00 =

240.00

cocktails forks © $80.00 =

240.00

lemon fork

80.00

salad set

190.00

pie server

102.50
TOTAL

$4,417.50

July 1986 price was $169.00, 4 piece place setting.
August 1987 mail order price from The Yankee Merchant Group,
$133.50 for 4 piece place setting.
August 1987 mail order price from James Kaplan Jewelers,
$136.95 for 4 piece setting.

EXHIBIT R

EXHIBIT "N"

CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579
Attorney for Defendant
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
GARY W. JENSE,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

v.

)

SARA A. JENSE,

)
)
)

Defendant.

ANSWER TO MOTION TO AMEND
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Civil No. D85-702
(Judge Scott Daniels)

ooOoo
The Defendant above named, by and through counsel,
Craig M. Peterson, answers Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Decree of
Divorce dated August 3, 1987, as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's fails to state a cause of action upon which
relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
1.

Defendant admits paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Motion

insofar as it alleges that he received bonuses.

However,

Defendant is without sufficient information to admit or deny that
the Plaintiff did not receive a bonus in 1986 and, therefore,
denies the same.
2.

Defendant denies paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of

Plaintiff's Motion.

EXHIBIT N

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
All of the issues raised by Plaintiff's Motion are res
judicata, being issues relating to the division of the marital
estate of the parties at the time of trial and the entry of the
Decree of Divorce in this matter.

All such issues were litigated

and an Order entered making a division of the estate at that time
based upon circumstances and facts which then existed.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Motion is brought only for the purpose of
further avoiding collection in this matter and is not brought in
good faith, believing in the merits of his action.

It is reason-

able that the Defendant should be awarded such attorney's fees
and costs as she may incur in her defense of these proceedings.
WHEREFORE, Defendant having fully replied to Motion of
the Plaintiff, prays that the same be dismissed, that he take
nothing thereby and that Defendant be awarded such attorney's
fees and costs as she may have incurred in her defense of these
proceedings.
DATED this f~/

day of AuqjuKTE} 1987

IG W. PETERS
rney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to Motion to Amend
Decree of Divorce to David S. Dolowitz, Attorney for Plaintiff,
-2-

185 South State Street, Suite 700, Post Office Box 11898, Salt
Lake City, Utah

21754

84147-0898, this 2

clay of August, 1987.

EXHIBIT "0"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY + STATE OF UTAH
—ooOOoo—

1
2

GARY W.

JENSE,
Plaintiff,

3
4
5

D

—vs —
6

702
PLAINTIFFS'

7
8

R5

MOTION TO AMEND
SARA A . J E N S E ,
Defendant,

9
10

BE I T REMEMBERED,

I!
12

of

8:30

a.m.,

13

regularly

14

t h e Judges of

for

that

on A u g u s t

the above-captioned
hearing before
t h e above-named

24,

1987,

c a u s q of a c t i o n

at

the

hour

came on

t h e HON. SCOTT DANIELS, o n e

of

Court.

15
A P P E A R A N C E S

16
17
For t h e

Plaintiff;

MR. DAVID S . DOLCWriZ
A t t o r n e y A t Law
185 S o u t h S t a t e S t .
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utali

For t h e

Defendant:

MR. CRAIG M. PETERSEN
A t t o r n e y At* Law
426 S o u t h 5th E a s t
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

EXHIBIT 0

WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had:
THE COURT:

Gary W. Jense versus Sara A. Jense.

Motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce.

This your motion, Mr.

Dolowitz, you may proceed.
MR. DOLOWITZ:

Court want to hear testimony?

would be precisely as set forth in the affidavit.

It

Two

affidavits and two motions before the Courtrand if you want,
I can have that testimony «and run through it on the basis tha^:
it's already before you.
THE COURT:

I see no problem in just proceeding

on the basis of the affidavit unless you have a problem with
that.
MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:
MR. DOLOWITZ:

No, Your Honor.
You can proceed.
Your Honor, on the evidence that

we would put forward, we ask for amendment in two areas.
First is,VB would seek to be credited with ten-thousand
dollars for the silver that was taken from the safe-deposit
box;that the silver was in the safe-deposit box at the time
we came before you for trial.

While we were negotiating the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree, it was
removed and taken by Mrs. Jense.

At the time we were before

you, it was in the possession of Mr. Jens§..
would have left it with him.

She removed it.

Your ruling
We are willing

to give it to her, but we want credit on the judgment.

The

second item, Your Honor, involves request that the judgment

2

the matters that have been reduced to judgment,
$43,314.46 as of April 1st, 1987, be either reduced or deali n g from our view, totally terminated based on a change of
circumstances;that is, my client has

lost his job.

Now, as you recall, the system wherein he was working
for, ultimately, Foothill Thrift, based oh his earnings from
the year before, he would-be paid a bonus.

Based on his '84

earnings, there was a substantial bonus in '85.
'85 earnings there was a bonus in '86.
divided.

Based on hi«£

That •86 bonus was

You had him pay half to Mrs. Jense and he kept hal|

You also entered, as part of your judgment, that there
are $27,000 some odd dollar judgment, alimony and attorney
fees;but after my client had paid off the taxes that v/ere du^,
there simply wasn't enough cash, so you stayed execution on
the judgment until 1987, when the '86 bonus would come in.
There was no '86 bonus.

What happened in 1986, Foothill did

not produce enough, so that there could be a bonus rand v/hen
we were before you last, Foothill was facing receivership.
But now, at this point, Foothill has been taken over by
Zion's Bank.

And my client has been released.

Not only doe^

he not have a bonus for .'86, that will be paid in '87, he
doesn't even have a job.

The last money that he received

from his employment, as we set out in the affidavit, is
approximately $7000, is what he has received.
end of his income.

That was the

He now has to look for a job.

The house

3

1

in Utah County, at least he has an offer on it.

2 At the time we were before you, it was .$50,000. The sale
3 price is going to produce around #19,000. We will get sorae4 -where between nineteen and twenty-thous and dollars in cash
5 when that sale completes. Ke has, on the other side, servicejl
6 the debt that kept the properties together,and while those
7 assets were awarded to him, if he doesn't service those debtsL
8 Mrs. Jense is also a co-signer on those debts. And we have
9 detailed those debts in the affidavit;and she will be equally
10 liable with them.
1!

His living expenses continue, consequently, we think,

12 under the criteria that has been set out by the Utah Supreme
13 [Court, we meet the test for a substantial change in circum14 stances that is required to modify the property provision s ofj
15 the Decree in this case, to give her the silver and something
16 to eliminate the rest of:the judgment on the change.

My clienjt

17 simply can't pay it;and based on the circumstances, that he
18 kould have these ongoing bonuses to be able to pay this judge-]
19 -ment that you made on the marital estate, it is not what you
20 thought it was.

It has been switched by the

silver going from

21 ray client to Mrs. Jense; and has been switched by the hous e
22 being over $30,000 less than the Court determined that it was.
23 [Yet it based the judgment on a $27,000 to equalize the maritalj
24 estate.

Now, that wouldn't equalize it.

In fact, it would

25 make it even more unequal thah it already is.

4

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, We filed an Answer to

Amended Decree of Divorce. Under the terms of the decree of
divorce,the Court directed that Mrs. Jense would receive the
property, which was located in her condominium;that Mr. Jense!
would receive property which he had, and some specific divis-j
-ions, which the Court ordered on personal property awarded
to Mrs. Jense. Those divisions, though they were ordered by
the Court, have not yet been made. That is, Mr. Jense has
not made the transfer, but the silver which is at issue, deal
-rly was not in the possession of Mr. Jense at the time of th|
hearing on this matter in 1986;and he knew that it was never
in his possession.

Knew that it belonged to Mrs. Jense.

The silver was located, at the time of the divorce,
in the condominium, where Mrs. Jense

resided

here in Salt

Lake City;and that's clear from the affidavit attached to the
Reply, which is the affidavit. A Pleasant Grove bank shows
the last time these parties had two safe-deposit boxes—by th|
way, the last time either of those boxes were entered into byj
anyone was in March of 1985, when the daughter of the parties
went to the safe-deposit box and removed the silverware,by th|
way, silverware, which Mr. Jense knows was accumulated by
Mrs. Jense

from the time she was a small child up to the

date of the marriage;and no addition made to that silverware.
But the Court ordered that would be hers, fully one
year before this matter was heard by the Court.

5

That was taken from the safe-deposit box and was in
her possession.

Mr. Jense "knows that.

I think the represent-

ations in the affidavits here before the Cou: t today are
clearly not honest.

Those items were removed and were in heir

possession at the time of the decree as Mr. Jense knows. In|
addition, the only reason that they were even in the safe-deposit box was because there had been a series of thefts
in the Alpine

neighborhood where they lived. And they had

removed them and put them in the safe-d§posit box for a shor-f:
period of time for safekeeping.

Never anticipated by Mr.

Jense they would be his. They were not in his possession at]
•the time of the decree of divorce.
The divorce is accurate.

It's a misrepresentation to|

state to this Court-at the time they came before the Court,
I wasn't counsel at the time.

Out it's a clear misrepresent]

-ation to state now before the Court, especially based upon
the affidavits that they received and acknowledged,that he
has, that this was in his possession at the time.
not.

It was

The evidence is clear and I have the records here,

though I didn't submit them to the Court—I have the records]
of entrance into the safe-desposit box, which will clearly
show, if the Court wants to review them;the last time anyone!
entered into either one of these safe-deposit boxes was fully
one year before this matter was tried by the Court.
the motion- is not well-founded.

I thinki

I think it is specious and

6

I think that us being here today to defend against that
should entitle

us to attorney fees and ask for that relief

in response to his motion. Without question that's the case
In addition,as an aside, you'll notice from Mr. Jense's affi4
-davit, that he bases the value of that silver on a financial
declaration that he himself prepared and signed.

Has no

signature of Sara Jense. lie set that value at ten-thousand
dollars on that old 1984 loan application, because he was
seeking a loan.

But you'll notice also from our Answer,that

the maximum value, based on full retail suggested manufacturer's price, is $4,400 for the settings that they had. So,
first and most important under the terms of the Order, as it
was entered, that property was .in her possession at the time
this matter came before the Court and had been in her possesfj
-ion for at least a year--March of this

^wasn't heard unti.}

April of '86. So, from Jtfarch '85 until April of '86, that
property was in her possession.

The Court ordered she would

have that property, which was in her possession.
misrepresentation on that. part.

Clearly a

Second page, the value of it}

is nowhere near what Mr. Jense says.

Simply trying to gain

an advantage by making these misrepresentations to the Court
here today.
Dotiiof those positions clearly indicated it is not
necessary to be hex3 today on that particular issue. We
shouldn't be here today;as a result, we are entitled to

7

attorney's fees and should be awarded we believe in this
particular hearing.
The second matter is more disconcerting to me. Thai}
is, Mr. Jense is now before the Court and'represents to the
Court, that because his job status has changed, that the
Court should come in and modify an award of property, which
the Court made over a year and a half ago, based upon the
circumstances as they existed then. That is, the properties
as they existed then.
Mr. Jense had the advantage at that time of receiving the home, which he wanted to receive and placing it for
sale and getting the equity out of it;b\it as the Court will
recall from her testimony,

Mr. Jense

simply left that home

Didn't actively market it.

It was his testimony at the

previous hearing in %>ril of this year, when we were trying
to execute on this judgment that he had, that it wasn't
formally listed.

But he had a friend, who had been trying tcj>

market it to some degree in the Utah County area.
Now, I'll advise the Court, that it finally has sol<jl
and Mr. Jense is suffering the same thing that everyone else
has suffered, who has received parcels of real property.
That there is some decline in the market place. The property
at that time was listed at

approximately $145 to $150,000,

that is, at the time of the divorce*
I'll advise the Court that Mr. Jense now represents

8

to the Court that he has an offer on that at $119,000 \

1
2

That's not honest either.

He has an earnest money contract

3

at $124,500.

4

today by over

5

why he would make that representation.

6

-imately 15 % on the value the Court determined based upon

7

h i s representations at that time.

8

representation to the Court too, by the fact that he wanted

9

to receive that properly.

He has misrepresented the offering price here
$5000 and he knows that.

I am curious as to
He is down by approx-f

I think he is bound by hid

He was willing to assume the risk

I0

if he could get the property at that time, and assumed the

jI

risk.

12
13

It's error at this point

to come in and make a

modification of a property distribution based upon

e change

14 I of circumstances that has occurred only in the last six
15

months, vhen clearly I think it is res judicata completely on

16

that particular issue.

17

versus Folger, that has not JVE t to be a change of circumstaA-

18

-ces,hut an extraordinary change of circumstances

19

akin to misrepresentation at the time of the hearing for a

20

change of property distribution.

21

The Court h a s determined in Folger

something

That's not the case here.

If the Court is genuinely interested

and believes thai}:

22

there is a basis for consideration of modification of a

23

property distribution, then I think we have a right to a

24

complete trial and open that issue, rather than this very

25

short hearing and these proffers of counsel, which is coming

before the Court today;but I think there is not suffij-cient showing and there is not sufficient reason to come in
and set aside a property distribution which the Court ordered
at that time;and that's what the Court did.
Mrs. Jense didn't get alimony.

She was employed and

the Court made property distributions and gave her this larg4
sum judgment based upon the property distribution and property
values as represented to the Court at the time of the trial.
The Court accepted the property values which existed then.
The change between then and now is not sufficient reason to
simply come in and amend a decree of divorce.
As I am saying, one, we don't think there is sufficient
cause for even a consideration of change of the property;but
if there is, then we believe we're entitled to a complete
trial on that issue in order to determine, in fact, whether
there was or was not some sort of misrepresentation at the
time of the hearing on the trial.
And again, I think we are here unneccessarily to defeijid
-ing this issue and again, I think we're entitled to our fees
and costs as we have incurred them in this proceeding, Your
Honor, and based on that, we'll submit it.
THE COURT:

How much is the judgment that's owed?|

MR. DOLOWITZ:

$43,314.46 as of April 1st.

MR. PETERSON:

Plus interest.

In addition, a six]

hundred dollars award of attorney's fees for our appearance

1

before the Court last time, in reality, round figures is)
forty-four thousand dollars.
THE COURT:

And you're asking that that be forgivejn?

MR. DOLOWITZ:
THE COURT:

That's correct.
And what would happen to the $20,000

of equity that he is going to get on the American Fork home?!
MR. DOLOWITZ:

In the situation that he is involvejd

in, that he is in a cash negative situation each month and
he has been using the bonuses each year to pay the debt;he
has been paying a second mortgage on that home. He didn't
get a bonus for '86. He still has on-going debts and those
have to be paid off.
THE COURT:

So, he would get the $20,000 to pay

off his debt and a negative cash-flow situation.
you everything you want.

If I give

But he would get $44,000 judgment

forgiven and that would be in return,she would be able to
keep the silverware?
MR. DOLOWITZ:
you want to call it that,

That's correct. That would be, ifl
" our dea]".

That's our request.

There were a number of statements made about misrepresentatipr
I don't think are true and were misrepresented to you. That]1
an awful strong word for counsel

to use;and I believe you

ought to look at it. To start out with, he said no alimony.]
She was awarded alimony for a year. We stayed execution on
it.

That's part of the judgment.

sentations.

Said there were misrepre-

I said he was going to net $119 on the house.

1

1

Pidn't say that it was 124.

I gave the Court the

2

net figure rather than the gross figures, because I thought

3

that was important. That's presented as though that is some

4

kind of misrepresentation to you.

5

-entation it is this business with the silver. When Mr.

6

Dart and I tried this case before you on January 14, 1986#

^

the silver was

8

box.

'

we presented our exhibits to you, we presented everything.

'0

The silver was in his possession not in her condominium,yet

'1

Mr. Peterson stands up before you and says we all knew it,

12

but I didn't say we knew it. But at "the time the decree was

'3

he says we knew it when we were before you in April of '87.

14

If there is any misrepres

in my clients's possession in a safe-deposit

She went to the safe-depositLbox after the trial;when

If you want to talk about misrepresentation, that is

'5

the kind of misrepresentation I think the Court should look

'6

at and examine with particularity.

I would suggest that you

17

look over the trial exhibits and you'll see that the silver

18

was in my clients' possession when this matter was tried.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. DOLOWITZ:'

21

THE COURT:

22
23

When was it tried?
Tried in January of 1986.
V7ell, according to the affidavit, the

last recorded visit was in March of 1985.
MR. DOLOWITZ:

The decree recites that we were

24

before you on the 14th of January 1986. My client said that

"

he had the silverware in his possession at that time;was in
I his safe-deposit box as far as he knew;that M^s Jense got it.

1

She got it sometime after Mr, Dart and I were before

2

you for trial.

Taken it out of the box at that time.

He

3

became aware of it sometime—some months after that.

4

he and I were talking and he became aware the silverware had|

5

been moved, but at the time that we came in before

6

trial, it was our belief that that silver was still in the

7

safe-deposit box;and I think that is evidenced by an examin-

8

-ation of the Findings of Fact that are set out too.

9

understand what our position is.

That

you for

But yo^i

All I am doing is to reply]

10

to what I think was a misrepresentation.

If you want a full

H

trial on the matter we're willing to do it.

12

it's necessary;we've covered it, I think here.

13

dealing with is a situation like Chandler versus Wei£.

14

that case the Utah Supreme Court

15

decree that'.told the husband to make payments on the house

16

mortgage until it was paid off.

17

house and then sued on the decree, saying you now have to pay

18

me the money for the

19

the money.

20

that the decree meant what it said.

21

that judgment.

22

to Chandler versus Chandler and said, when you have signifi-

23

-cant change of circumstances, you have the power to amend

24

the decree;you do not

25

that type of change of circumstances occurred in this case.

I don't think
What you're)
In

was confronted with a

The wife remarried, sold thA

rest of the house, because I paid off

The trial judge, in that particular case held
You've got to pay off

The Utah Supreme Court reversed, referring

simply enforce it.

And we're saying

1

You entered a ruling that found that there should be

2

payments from my client to Mrs. Tosara and those were baseq

3

on certain findings, including the value of the house and

4

the pattern of bonuses that my client received.

5

foresee him losing his job so there waid be no bonuses with

6

which to be able to pay the judgment that we're talking

7

about;and didn't figure opt the house would drop 20 or 30-

8

thousand dollars, which is more than the ammount you ordere4

9

paid over in judgment to equal the marital estate. And we

It did not

10

are now in a situation where Mrs, Jense is employed and Mr.

"

Jense is not.

12

financial position, not my client.

13

She's the one who is still in the solid

THE COURT:

Well, I think it's a tough'thing to

14

know what to do, because it's true that the property settle-}

15

-ment was based upon the presumption that he was going to

'6

get a pretty big bonus, because he always had. And

''

think he would have got a bigger bonus than I anticipated.

'8

On the other hand, I don't know that it would have changed

19

the property settlement.

20

of the case, I am going to rule as follows:

21
22
23

MR, PETERSON:
one point.

I didn^

I think, based upon the equities
I am going to-4

Before you rule, I wuld like to ma)|e

He did get one big bonus which was distributed.

THE COURT:

That's right.

It was distributed,

24

that's right. And as I recall the ruling,that one was goinqr

2

to be cut in half.

*

That's what happened, but we anticipates.

14

that he would get a bonus in 1987 based upon 1986
earnings. And just that there is not as much money as they
thought there was going to be and I don't know what to do
about

what I am going to do is this ,though*

the equity from the home should be to her.

I think thaj:

She should get

that $19 or $20,000, whatever it is and the silver should go
to her;and that's really ctll there is. And so, I think if
that goes to her, the remainder of the judgment, the other
$24,000 will be considered satisfied.

Now, I don't suppose

either of them are going to be too happy with that outcome.
MR. PETERSON:

One point you need to be aware of.

That $24,000 satisfaction ruling, Your Honor, Mrs. Jense,
were she called to testify, would testify, as you made that
ruling, seven-thousand of that was furniture, which he kept
and still has ,in part of the furniture distribution, if the
Court is going to change the ruling in consideration of that
then I guess, we need to reopen all of it, so that you make
adequate furniture and personal property distributions as
well.

THE COURT:

Where is that furniture, in the house?]

MR. PETERSON:

Still in the house.

MR. DOL0WITZ:

We have made repreated attempts to

get her to come down and pick i£ up.

None of them have come|

to fruition.
MR. PETERSON:

Talking about that which was awardeld

15

1

2
3

t o him, not t h e f u r n i t u r e t h a t was awarded t o h e r .
MR. DOLOWITZ:

Thought you were t a l k i n g about

t h i n g s t h a t a r e Tier's s t i l l i n t h e h o u s e .

4

MR. PETERSON:

We s t i l l want t h o s e .

5

MR. DOLOWITZ:

Been a s k i n g h e r t o come down and

6 p i c k them u p .
7

MR. PETERSON:

We have made the request.

Simply

8

haven't facilitated on the furniture that was awarded to her.

9

Her point is very simply, they are in this judgments jyau gave!

10

consideration of seven-thousand dollars in furniture that was

I!

awarded to him, when you made that'-judgment: So,

12

what happened is, he is now receiving satisfaction of $24,000(

13

while there was a seven-thousand dollars consideration in

14

there that he is still retaining.

15

THE COURT:

as a result]

Well, I see your point, but you know,

16

the bottom line is, as it turned out, when all was said and

17

done, she appears to me has ended up with considerably more

18

than half of the marital estate, you know.

19

way it should be;but seems to me that the bottom line, you

20

know, after everything happened, that we didn't foresee

21

considering the drop in value of the property, considering noj

22

bonus therei

23

ends up with mere than half of it and half was all she was

24

entitled to.

25

of the drop in property and I don't suppose she'll be happy.

Maybe that's the

What was there really to divide up, she still

She's having to suffer some of the disadvantage^

1<

'

j <30n't suppose I will either.

The problem is,

2

there is not as much money as he thought there.would be.

3

That will be the ruling.

4

attorney's fees will be awarded for this particular hearing

5

and I'll ask Mr. Dolowitz to prepare an

6

to Mr. Peterson for approval as to form.

7
8

MR. DOLOWITZ:
I

Under the circumstances, no

Order and submit it]

,1 will.

(WHEREUPON this hearing was concluded.)

9
C E R T I F I C A T E

10
11
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I, Hal M. Walton, do hereby certify that I am a
Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah;that on

'5 j August 24th, 1987, I appeared before the above-named Court
16

and reported in Stenograph the proceedings outlined in the

17

preceeding 16 pages of hearing transcript and that the same

18

is a true and correct transcriptioh of

19

as reported by me.

20
21
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23
24
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Dated:

September 23, 1987

my shorthand notes

EXHIBIT

"P"

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

GARY JENSE,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND
PRIOR ORDERS OF THE COURT

VS.

Civil No. D85-702
Judge Scott Daniels

SARA A. JENSE,
Defendant.

* * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter came before the court, the
Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, on Monday, the 24th day of
August, 1987.

The plaintiff was present in person and repre-

sented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz.

The defendant was present

in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson.

The

court, after being advised by the parties that their testimony
would be in accordance with the written pleadings and affidavits
they had filed with the court, determined with the agreement of
counsel for each of the parties, to accept that as being the testimony and then heard and considered the arguments of counsel.
Being advised in the premises, the court determined that at the

EXHIBIT
(!.

time it entered
1986, it was

a Decree of Divorce

in this matter, July 14,

the intention of the court to equally divide the

marital estate of the parties and the belief of

the court was

that it had done so; however, there had been significant changes
of circumstances which rendered that division ineffective*

The

plaintiff has had a pattern for many years of being paid a substantial bonus in February or March of each year based on the
earnings of his employer for the prior year.

Following that pat-

tern, the court divided equally the bonus due in 1986 based upon
the earnings in 1985, entered a judgment in paragraph 7 of the
Decree which required payment by the plaintiff to the defendant
of $27,750,00 plus interest, required the payment of alimony to
the defendant in paragraph
fees

in

paragraph

10

received

insufficient

employer

of

8 of the Decree and for attorney's

receive a bonus in 1987.

the

Decree,

In

income

and

1986,

plaintiff's

plaintiff

did

not

As a result, this court determined on

April 1, 1987, to reduce all of the sums that were due to the
plaintiff to judgment in the amount of $43,314.46 and stayed execution on that judgment until the plaintiff's situation became
more clear.

The plaintiff was terminated from his employment in

July of 1987 as the business entity for which he worked was purchased by Zions UtahBank Corp who merged that entity into its own
operations
need

for

and
his

released
services.

the plaintiff
The

as there was no further

plaintiff

-2-

sold

the

home

of

the

p a r t i e s in Utah County which had been valued by the court at the
time of the divorce a t $150,000.00 for a gross s e l l i n g p r i c e of
approximately $124,000.00 and a net s e l l i n g

p r i c e of

approxi-

mately $119,000.00 which w i l l produce a net proceed of s a l e of
approximately

$20,000.00,

as

opposed

to

the

$50,000.00

-

$60,000.00 the court believed would be produced by the s a l e of
that property.

In a d d i t i o n , the defendant, between the time of

the t r i a l of t h i s matter on January 14, 1986, and the entry of
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree on July 14,
1986, went to the bank where the p a r t i e s had stored t h e i r s i l v e r ware and removed t h a t silverware from the safety
The p l a i n t i f f
while

believed t h a t the silverware was worth $10,000.00

the defendant

$4,500.00.

deposit box.

believed

that

it

was worth

approximately

These circumstances in the opinion of the court con-

s t i t u t e a s u b s t a n t i a l change of circumstance in t h a t the i n t e n t
of the court has been thwarted by events r e s u l t i n g in the defendant being awarded more than one-half of the m a r i t a l e s t a t e which
requires,

in

equity,

a modification

of

the

Decree and

prior

orders and judgments of the court which, even a f t e r the modificat i o n , r e s u l t s , the court b e l i e v e s , in the defendant being awarded
more than one-half of the e s t a t e of the p a r t i e s , thus, the court
must modify the Decree of Divorce and prior orders and judgments
of t h i s court to provide t h a t the defendant be awarded the

sil-

verware t h a t she has removed from the bank deposit box and taken

-3-

into her possession and the net proceeds of sale of the home of
the parties and that upon payment to her of the net proceeds of
salef

that all prior awards, judgments and orders of the court

requiring payment to her should be deemed satisfied and paid in
full and all financial obligations of the plaintiff to the defendant be deemed satisfied.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The Decree of Divorce

and all prior orders and

judgments of this court which require financial payments by the
plaintiff to the defendant shall be deemed satisfied and paid in
full upon the payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
net proceeds

of sale of

the parties1

home in Pleasant Grove,

Utah.
2.

The

defendant

is

awarded

all

right, title

and

interest of the parties to the silverware that she has removed
from the safety deposit box of the parties during the pendency of
the action.
3.

Upon the completion of the payment envisioned in

paragraph 1 above, the plaintiff shall have met all of his financial obligations to the defendant and all obligations as herein
ordered in the Decree of Divorce and the orders and judgments of
this court shall be deemed satisfied and the defendant shall sign
any document necessary to, as a matter of record, declare that
these obligations have been satisfied.

-4-

4.

Each

party

should

pay

their

own

attorney's fees as incurred herein.
DATED this ~}_ day of

Qj2^_

, 1987.

SCOTT DANIELS
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS REFLECTING
THE RULINGS OF THE COURT:

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Plaintiff

CRAIG M. PETERSON
Attorney for Defendant
DSD:090187D

-5-

costs

and

EXHIBIT "Q"

FILMED

DEC 8 1987
H D 1 W . H 1 r c 1 . 7 X ' i f ' 3*1 DIL,
:, Court
CepL-iy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARY JENSE,

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO, D-85-702

vs.
SARA A. JENSE,
Defendant.

After due consideration of the Objection to the form of the
Order in this case, and to defendant's Motion for a Trial, along
with the pleadings that have been filed in connection therewith,
and my review of the notes in this case, I am of the view that
the marital
defendant

estate was equitably
received

more

than

distributed.
half

of

In fact the

the

total

estate.

Consequently, the Objection will be overruled, and the Motion
denied.

I have signed the proposed Order as of December 7, 1987.

Dated this

*

day of December, 1987.

CA^jJ^

£

SCOTT DANIELS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CtJtffc

EXHIBIT Q

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE TWO

JENSE V. JENSE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

^

day of December, 1987:

David S. Dolowitz
Attorney for Plaintiff
185 S. State, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Craig M. Peterson
Attorney for Defendant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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